Regional Evaluation of EC-funded Mine Action Support in Asia-Pacific 2002-2008 by Paterson, Ted et al.
James Madison University 
JMU Scholarly Commons 
Global CWD Repository Center for International Stabilization and Recovery 
Winter 2-2009 





Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) 
Mao Vanna 
Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-globalcwd 
 Part of the Defense and Security Studies Commons, Peace and Conflict Studies Commons, and the 
Social Policy Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Paterson, Ted; Tollefsen, Erik; and Vanna, Mao, "Regional Evaluation of EC-funded Mine Action Support in 
Asia-Pacific 2002-2008" (2009). Global CWD Repository. 114. 
https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-globalcwd/114 
This Other is brought to you for free and open access by the Center for International Stabilization and Recovery at 
JMU Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Global CWD Repository by an authorized 










REGIONAL EVALUATION OF EC-FUNDED MINE 




























This evaluation is funded by 


















The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) strives for a world free of anti-personnel 
mines and from the threat of other landmines and explosive remnants of war, and where the suffering and concerns of 
populations living in affected areas are addressed. The Centre is active in research, provides operational assistance and 




Evaluation of EC-Funded Mine Action Support in Asia-Pacific: 2002-2008, Geneva, February 2009 
 
This project has been managed by Ted Paterson, Head of Evaluation and Policy Research, GICHD, t.paterson@gichd.org 
 
This document has been produced with the financial assistance of the European Union. The contents of this document are 





© Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining 
The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the 
Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining. The designation employed and the presentation of the material 
in this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the GICHD concerning the legal 































EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.................................................................................................................... ii 
Background ................................................................................................................................................... ii 
Methodology .................................................................................................................................................. ii 
Overview of EC Funded Mine Action in Asia-Pacific.............................................................................................. ii 
EC Mine Action strategy for Asia-Pacific.............................................................................................................iii 
Coordination ..................................................................................................................................................iii 
Country Findings, Conclusions & Recommendations ........................................................................................... iv 
Cambodia ................................................................................................................................................ iv 
Lao PDR................................................................................................................................................... vi 
Sri Lanka ................................................................................................................................................ viii 
Burma/Myanmar...................................................................................................................................... viii 
General Recommendations ............................................................................................................................. ix 
1.  Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 1 
Background ................................................................................................................................................... 1 
Terms of Reference ........................................................................................................................................ 3 
Methodology .................................................................................................................................................. 3 
Limitations .................................................................................................................................................... 4 
2. GENERAL FINDINGS................................................................................................................... 5 
Overview of EC Funded Mine Action Support ...................................................................................................... 5 
Total EC Mine Action Funding to the Region................................................................................................... 5 
Allocations of Mine Action Funding ............................................................................................................... 6 
3. Country Findings........................................................................................................................ 9 
Cambodia...................................................................................................................................................... 9 
Context .................................................................................................................................................... 9 
History of the Mine Action Programme .......................................................................................................... 9 
Mine Action in National Development Strategies........................................................................................... 11 
EC Support for Cambodia .......................................................................................................................... 12 
EC Assistance for Mine Action .................................................................................................................... 13 
Conclusions, Lessons Learned, & Recommendations ..................................................................................... 21 
Lao PDR ...................................................................................................................................................... 27 
Context .................................................................................................................................................. 27 
History of The UXO Sector......................................................................................................................... 28 
UXO in National Development Strategies..................................................................................................... 30 
EC Support for Mine Action........................................................................................................................ 31 
Conclusions and Key Issues....................................................................................................................... 34 
Other Asia-Pacific Countries........................................................................................................................... 37 
Sri Lanka ................................................................................................................................................ 37 
Burma/Myanmar...................................................................................................................................... 39 
Key Issues .............................................................................................................................................. 39 
 
 
7. OVERALL CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS..................................................................... 40 
Relevance ............................................................................................................................................... 40 
Efficiency ................................................................................................................................................ 42 
Effectiveness ........................................................................................................................................... 42 
Deconcentration and the End of the APL Budget line..................................................................................... 42 
Donor Coordination .................................................................................................................................. 42 
Coordination among EC Agencies for LRRD.................................................................................................. 43 
Appendix 1 – Terms of Reference ..................................................................................................... i 
Appendix 2 –Persons Met............................................................................................................... vi 
Cambodia ................................................................................................................................................ vi 
Laos ........................................................................................................................................................vii 
Appendix 3 – List of documents consulted ......................................................................................viii 
For Cambodia .............................................................................................................................................. viii 
EC & EC Project Documents....................................................................................................................... viii 
Mine Action Documents ............................................................................................................................ viii 
Royal Government of Cambodia................................................................................................................... x 
For Laos ........................................................................................................................................................ x 
Government of the Lao Peoples Democratic Republic ...................................................................................... x 
UXO sector................................................................................................................................................ x 
Other ...................................................................................................................................................... xi 
Appendix 4 – EC-funded Mine Action Projects in Asia-Pacific ..............................................................xii 
Cambodia.....................................................................................................................................................xii 





Figure 1 – EC funding for mine action in Asia-Pacific .......................................................................... 5 
Figure 2 – Allocation of funding by country ....................................................................................... 6 
Figure 3 – Source of funds since 2002.............................................................................................. 6 
Figure 4 – Mine action funding by budget line category ...................................................................... 7 
Figure 5 – EC mine action funding relative to total from international sources 2002-07 .......................... 7 
Figure 6 – Funding by type of recipient ............................................................................................ 8 
Figure 7 – Landmine and UXO casualties: 2000-2007....................................................................... 10 
Figure 8 – EC Funding for Mine Action in Cambodia.......................................................................... 14 
Figure 9 – Main purpose of EC funding for mine action ..................................................................... 14 
Figure 10 – Highly-impacted districts (per capita basis highlighting ECOSORN districts) ....................... 24 
Figure 11 – Estimated EC funding for the UXO sector ....................................................................... 32 
Figure 12 – International funding to mine action in Sri Lanka............................................................ 38 
Figure 13 – EC funding to mine action in Sri Lanka .......................................................................... 39 





Table 1 – Mine Action funding to the Asia-Pacific ............................................................................... 5 
Table 2 – Targets and actual funding for mine action (EUR millions) .................................................... 6 
Table 3 – Mine action targets in NSDP & MDGs................................................................................ 12 
Table 4 – UXO/Mine Clearance Priorities ......................................................................................... 29 
Table 5 – Clearance operators & provinces or clients covered in 2007 ................................................ 29 
 
Textboxes 
Textbox 1 – The EU Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labour................................ 12 
Textbox 2 – Relevant issues in the MIP for Asia: 2007-2010 ............................................................. 13 













AIDCO EuropeAid Cooperation Office M & E  Monitoring and Evaluation 
APL  Anti-Personnel Landmines MAC Mine Action Centre 
APMBC Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention MAFF Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
ASEAN Association of South-East Asian Nations MAG Mines Advisory Group 
AXO Abandoned ordnance MAPU Mine Action Planning Unit 
BAC Battle Area Clearance MDD Mine Detecting Dog 
CCM Convention on Cluster Munitions MDG Millennium Development Goal 
CMAA Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority MIP Multi-annual Indicative Programme 
CMAC Cambodian Mine Action Centre MRE Mine Risk Education 
CMVIS Cambodian Mine Victim Information System NDO  National Demining Office 
COPE Co-operative Orthotic and Prosthetic Enterprise NGO Non-Governmental Organisation 
CSP Country Strategy Paper NIP National Indicative Programme 
DEVCO EC Directorate General for Development  NMAA National Mine Action Authority 
DIPECHO Disaster preparedness/mitigation programme NPA Norwegian Peoples’ Aid 
EC European Commission NRA National Regulatory Authority 
ECHO European Community Humanitarian Aid Office NSA-LA Non-State Actors & Local Authorities 
ECOSORN Economic and Social Relaunch of the Northwest NSDP National Strategic Development Plan (Cambodia) 
EIDHR European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights NSEDP National Socio-Economic Development Plan (Laos) 
EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal OECD/DAC Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development/Development Assistance Committee  
ERW Explosive Remnants of War PBA Programme-Based Approach 
EU European Union PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 
FSD Fondation Suisse de Déminage PTF Project Task Force 
GDP Gross Domestic Product QA Quality Assurance 
GICHD Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining QC Quality Control 
HALO Hazardous-Area Life support Organisation RCAF Royal Cambodian Armed Forces 
HI Handicap International RELEX EC Directorate General for External Relations 
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross RGC Royal Government of Cambodia 
IDP Internally Displaced Person SAL Safer Access to Land (an ECOSORN component) 
IMAS International Mine Action Standards SOP Standing Operating Procedure 
IMSMA Information Management System for Mine Action TA Technical Advisor 
INGO International Non-Governmental Organisation TOR Terms of Reference 
IRD Integrated Rural Development UNHCR  United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
KR Khmer Rouge UNMAS United Nations Mine Action Service 
LIS Landmine Impact Survey UNDP United Nations Development Programme 
LRRD Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development UNTAC United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia 
LTTE Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam USD United States Dollar 
LUPU Land Use Planning Unit UXO Unexploded Ordnance 
  VA Victim Assistance 
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
 
 Page ii 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
BACKGROUND 
In 2001 the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament adopted two Regulations on the 
reinforcement of the EU response against Antipersonnel Landmines (APL).1 These (referred to 
collectively as “the Regulation”) laid the foundation of an integrated European policy. The 
Regulation states the need to regularly assess operations financed by the Community and that the 
European Commission (EC) shall submit to the European Parliament an overall assessment of all 
Community mine action. To implement these provisions, the EC commissioned a global 
assessment of EC mine policy and actions over the period 2002-2004 and entered into an 
agreement with the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) to, inter 
alia, manage the programme of regional evaluations to identify lessons learned within EC-funded 
mine action projects in the six regions, one of which is Asia-Pacific.  
 
The regional evaluations complement the Global Assessment by focusing on relevant conclusions 
and recommendations from the Global Assessment, and EC mine action strategy and 
programming issues at the country level. The evaluation does not assess the efficiency, 
effectiveness, and impact of individual projects, except to illustrate changes since the Global 
Assessment or critical programming issues.  
METHODOLOGY 
The evaluation covered the period 2002 until today. Cambodia and Laos were selected for 
country missions, with other countries in the region covered by desk research. 
 
The Evaluation Team comprised Ted Paterson (GICHD) and Dr. Mao Vanna (independent 
consultant) for the Cambodia mission, and Ted Paterson and Erik Tollefsen (both GICHD) for 
Laos. The desk study was conducted by Ted Paterson, assisted by Nara Weigel and Ginevra 
Cucinotta. 
 
The main constraint in this study – which did not prove serious – was access to some of 
documents relating to tenders and contracts for mine action services.  
OVERVIEW OF EC FUNDED MINE ACTION IN ASIA-PACIFIC 
For the periods covered by the two EC APL Strategies, total EC funding to mine action in the 
Asia-Pacific region fell somewhat, both in absolute terms (a 30% drop from € 13.6 million to € 
9.4 million) and as a percentage of global total of EC-funding to mine action. 
  
Mine Action funding to the Asia-Pacific 
Period Total EC Mine Action 
Funding 




pre-2002 n.a. € 10.3 million -- 
2002-2004 € 145.2 million € 13.6 million 9.6% 
2005-2007 € 141.1 million € 9.4 million 6.7% 
2008 n.a. € 2.2 million -- 
Sources: Total EC funding – Landmine Monitor 2003-2008; Funding for Asia-Pacific – our data. 
 
This is a very modest amount given the scale of the problem in the region. 
                                                     
1 Regulation (EC) 1724/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2001 concerning action against 
anti-personnel landmines in developing countries (OJ L 234, 1.9.2001, p.1) and Regulation (EC) 1725/2001 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2001 concerning action against anti-personnel landmines in third 
countries other than developing countries (OJ L 234, 1.9.2001, p.6). The provisions are similar and we quote from 
Regulation (EC) 1724/2001. 
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Significant albeit declining funding was provided from both ECHO and the APL thematic budget 
lines during both periods covered by the EC Strategies. In 2005-07, large sums were provided for 
mine action from a variety of global or regional thematic programmes. Throughout the 2002-
2007 period, no EC funding for mine action appears to have come from the country envelopes. 
 

























EC MINE ACTION STRATEGY FOR ASIA-PACIFIC 
The problem of explosives contamination is not reflected explicitly in the EC Strategy for Asia. 
However, one component of this strategy for Association of South-East Asian Nation (ASEAN) 
members is Cooperation and Policy Reform in the Field of Security, which highlights border 
security. Demining would be an important supporting element to the implementation of any 
agreement to resolve the current border dispute between Cambodia and Thailand. As such, EC 
support to a cross-border demining initiative could be extremely relevant to this component of the 
EC Regional Strategy. 
 
EC strategy and programming documents for most of these countries have also highlighted the 
explosives contamination problems.2 Thus, EC assistance to mine action has also been relevant 
from the perspective of EC strategy and programming documents. 
COORDINATION  
Donor coordination often represents a problem for the EC in Asia-Pacific. The human and 
financial resources available to the (sub-) Delegations in the region are, for the most part, modest. 
At the same time, efforts to implement the Paris Declaration and to enhance aid effectiveness 
typically raise aid management transaction costs in the short-term (i.e. until General Budget 
Support schemes and Programme Based Approaches [PBA] can be formulated and agreed). This 
makes it extremely difficult for the (sub-) Delegation to adequately cover non-focus sectors.  
 
In recent years, AusAID has served as an ‘anchor donor’ for mine action in both Cambodia and 
Laos, with knowledgeable and experienced personnel plus medium-term financial commitments 
and some flexibility in how these are allocated. In Laos for example, AusAID was able to step-in 
quickly to keep the HI-B UXO programme running when the sub-Delegation learned that the 
funds programmed for Laos from the APL budget line would not be forthcoming. AusAID 
‘bridge finance’ allowed the sub-Delegation to explore other funding possibilities, which 
eventually proved successful. This experience suggests that there would be significant benefits if 
the EC Delegations and EU member state embassies could implement the EU Code of Conduct 
on Complementarity and Division of Labour. 
                                                     
2 The EC Strategy Paper for Burma/Myanmar: 2007-2013 includes only incidental remarks on landmine contamination. 
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In recent years, two joint UXO sector evaluations have been commissioned in Laos (by UNDP 
and UXO Lao/NRA) and a joint donor evaluation on the mine action sector was commissioned in 
Cambodia. Such programme-wide evaluations have many advantages over individual project 
evaluations and generally provide a better basis for programming decisions, particularly for 
marginal donors such as the EC for mine action in the Asia-Pacific region that do not have the 
funds or expertise on hand to maintain a coherent programme and coordinate with the 
government and other donors to the sector. 
 
Coordination among ECHO, RELEX and AIDCO to link relief, rehabilitation and development 
(LRRD) appears to have worked reasonably well in Sri Lanka and Laos. LRRD – at least in the 
context of EC development agencies continuing support for ECHO-financed initiatives – was not 
achieved in Cambodia. In spite of a positive evaluation of ECHO funded projects with a number 
of NGO operators, the sub-Delegation decided not to continue support to standalone mine action 
projects. From a broader perspective, however, the sub-Delegation’s decision to incorporate 
funds for mine action within a large integrated rural development (IRD) project seems both 
appropriate and a good example of LRRD.  
COUNTRY FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS 
CAMBODIA 
Cambodia is severely impacted by landmines (particularly in the north-west) and other explosive 
remnants of war (ERW – throughout most of the country, but heaviest in the east). The mine 
action programme started in 1992 under the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia 
(UNTAC), followed in late 1993 by the Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC), which served 
both the national mine action centre (MAC) and the largest operator.  
 
A corruption scandal led to the resignation of CMAC’s director in 1999, but subsequently he was 
appointed as Secretary-General to the new national authority – the Cambodian Mine Action and 
Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA) – when it was established in 2000. Accordingly, CMAA 
has received only modest donor support and has never adequately discharged its responsibilities.  
 
In spite of these difficulties, Cambodia’s mine action programme has many strengths because a 
very decentralised system has evolved. Most of the funds for demining are in the hands of the 
operators, which gives them significant independence to determine their priorities. Increasingly 
however, the operators are selecting tasks from preference lists established by the ‘bottom-up’ 
Mine Action Planning Unit (MAPU) process. Priorities are also established by a number of 
community development and integrated rural development (IRD) projects that incorporate mine 
action components. The largest of these is the EC-funded Economic and Social Relaunch of the 
Northwest provinces in Cambodia (ECOSORN) project, which has a Safer Access to Land (SAL) 
component – comprising demining and land titling – in lieu of a € 5 million standalone mine 
action project that had originally been included in the National Indicative Programme: 2002-04. 
 
Mine action features prominently in Cambodia’s Millennium Development Goals, the 
Government’s ‘Rectangular Strategy, and the National Strategic Development Plan 2006-2010 
(NSDP), which serves as the country’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). Regardless, 
EC assistance to mine action has been limited, in part because the country financial envelope is 
modest and in part due to concerns over the CMAA Secretary-General. Since 2002, about 40% of 
the € 3.7 million in EC mine action funding to Cambodia was provided by ECHO. Most of the 
rest is represented by an ECOSORN sub-contract for demining (about € 1.17 from the original € 
5 million standalone mine action project). 
 
The EC Mine Action Strategy for 2005-2007 had also programmed € 1.5 million for Cambodia, 
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which ultimately financed two grant agreements of € 500,000 each for victim assistance projects. 
These two projects had not begun at the time of the mission, but both build on established 
programmes run by experienced NGOs and there is every reason to expect the projects will be 
effective. 
 
The demining component of ECOSORN is also likely to prove effective in spite of serious 
project design flaws and start-up problems. The plans for the SAL component were not properly 
elaborated in the financing agreement and there was no provision for technical assistance in 
either demining and land titling, which took a year to rectify. In part because of this, there were a 
number of serious problems with the Terms of Reference in the tender issued for demining, 
which could not be rectified because of time pressure imposed by EC administrative procedures.3 
In the end, ECOSORN received only one proposal for demining. Our calculations suggest that 
achievement of the demining target will cost approximately $3 million, for which the contractor 
will receive only $1.5 million from ECOSORN. This implies that other donors are cross-
subsidising the EC-funded project by approximately $1.5 million.4  
 
In the first days following the award of contract, the demining contractor recommended to 
ECOSORN management that risk reduction measures (MRE for ECOSORN and sub-contractor 
personnel plus survey of all planned rural infrastructure works) be undertaken immediately. For 
various reasons, this recommendation was not acted upon straight away. In February 2008, an 
equipment operator working on an ECOSORN rural infrastructure task drove into a suspected 
minefield and exposing an anti-tank mine, which did not explode. A CMAC rapid response team 
located another four anti-tank mines nearby. Had the original antitank mine detonated, the 
equipment would have been completely destroyed and the operator almost certainly killed, while 
others in the vicinity could have been killed or injured. Had the other anti-tank mines exploded, 
the damage would have been correspondingly greater. About the same time a large UXO was 
discovered embedded in a dam on another ECOSORN worksite. 
 
The ECOSORN project yields a number of important lessons, including:5  
 
• When a project entails working in an area that may be contaminated by explosives: 
• Initial design surveys should investigate the possibility of explosives contamination in or 
around work sites 
• Arrangements for mine action support should be made 
 
• For projects entailing civil engineering works (especially infrastructure reconstruction), land 
preparation for agriculture, etc. in areas that may suffer from explosives contamination, the 
following additional steps should be taken: 
• Initial design surveys, social and environmental impacts surveys, etc. should: 
o investigate the possibility of explosives contamination in or around work sites  
o investigate the potential future dangers from people migrating to contaminated 
areas because infrastructure has been built or reconstructed, land has been 
improved for agriculture, etc., and 
o incorporate appropriate risk mitigation measures in the project design based on 
the findings of these investigations  
• Mine action experts should be involved in the preparation of all statements of work and 
                                                     
3 The main problem was the ‘D+3’ rule. This refers to EC procedures for external operations that require ‘contracts 
implementing the financing agreement’ to be signed within three years of the budgetary commitment by the 
Commission. For ECOSORN, the deadline was by 16 November 2007. 
4 While cross-subsidisation is not uncommon in aid, in this case better outcomes could have been achieved in a more 
transparent manner via a grant agreement with one of the operators to provide demining support to ECOSORN. See the 
chapter on Cambodia in this report, plus the Cambodia Mission Report, for an extended discussion of this issue. 
5 See the Cambodia section of this report or the Cambodia Country Mission report for a more detailed list. 
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contracts/grant agreements for mine action activities 
• Mine action risk mitigation measures should be in place before work on civil engineering 
or land preparation components begins  
• All tenders for civil engineering works should make explicit reference to the possibility 
of explosives contamination and that all sub-contractor personnel assigned to the project 
shall be required to complete a workplace safety Mine Risk Education (MRE) course 
prior to deployment in areas where contamination is suspected 
• As there is a residual risk to equipment and personnel when undertaking road 
reconstruction projects in contaminated regions, supplemental risk reduction measures 
(e.g. armour-protected equipment; fully-enclosed operator cabs; minimum safety 
distances for observers; standby demining support) should be required for specific 
sections of a road where the risk of contamination is high. 
 
• For both workplace safety and liability reasons, in some cases the EC may wish to require 
contactors and sub-contractors to provide insurance to their workers that covers legacy of war 
issues such as explosives contamination.  
 
• Contracts or other agreements with organisations responsible for demining support services 
to development activities should include clear statements that the overarching responsibility 
of the demining operator is the mitigation of explosives contamination risks for workers and 
the intended beneficiaries and that, where there is reasonable concern that workers or 
beneficiaries could be killed or injured, prior administrative approval is not required for any 




1. The EC sub-Delegation should meet with managers from ECOSORN, CMAC, and the Socio-
Economic section of CMAA to discuss lessons learned from the experience to date with 
ECOSORN, and possible steps to enhance the coordination between mine action and rural 
development (including the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries – MAFF). 
 
2. The EC should let it be known to the Foreign Ministers of Thailand and Cambodia that it is 
willing to support the implementation of an agreement to permanently resolve the current 
dispute centring on the Preah Vihear temple. Such support could include financial assistance 
for a joint effort to demine the disputed area, its vicinity and that adjacent to Preah Vihear 
temple, as was agreed at the 28 July 2008 meeting of the Foreign Ministers in Siem Reap. 
 
3. The EC should meet with representatives from EU member states to agree who should take 
the lead in the mine action sector, in line with the EU Code of Conduct on Complementarity 
and Division of Labour. 
 
4. EC headquarters should develop and issue clear principles and guidelines for its personnel 
responsible for mine action projects or development projects in areas affected by explosives 
contamination.7 
LAO PDR 
The U.S. dropped more bombs on Laos during the Vietnam War than all combatants combined 
used in the Second World War. As such, Laos has probably the worst explosives contamination 
                                                     
6 The Cambodia Mission Report contained another recommendation concerning the classification of the ECOSORN 
project in Cambodia’s aid database which is not relevant for the regional report. 
7 EC headquarters recently issued Guidelines on European Community Mine Action, which is a sound document but 
needs to be supplemented by more detailed guidance on technical mine action issues. 
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problem (mainly unexploded ordnance – UXO) in the world. A survey undertaken over 20 years 
after the cessation of bombing showed that 25% of all communities in the country were impacted 
by contamination. 
 
The UXO programme was started by MAG in 1994 and the following year the government 
established UXO LAO as the national operator, which eventually assumed responsibility for all 
operations. The programme continued expanding until 2002, when a drop in funding led to a 
UXO sector review that recommended a variety of reforms. In response, the government 
approved a 10-year UXO sector strategy, created the National Regulatory Authority (NRA – a 
combined national authority and MAC), and allowed international NGOs and firms to resume 
clearance operations. Funding has rebounded, and productivity – whether measured in metres 
squared or devices destroyed – has increased significantly. 
 
UXO contamination features prominently in the current national socio-economic development 
plan (NSEDP), where UXO clearance is one of three ‘poverty-focussed national programmes’. 
The NSEDP sets a clear and ambitious target – to clear UXO from all high priority agricultural 
areas by 2013.  
 
The EC has provided modest but steady support for the UXO sector since 1998, with most of the 
funding coming from ECHO, the APL thematic budget line or, most recently, other thematic 
programmes. No funds have been provided from the EC country envelope since the adoption of 
the EU Mine Action Strategy in 2002.  
 
The dependence on global or regional programmes – with no provision for UXO funding from 
the country envelope – led to a problem that threatened the continuation of an EC-financed UXO 
project implemented by HI. The € 1.5 million earmarked in the EU Mine Action Strategy for 
Laos in 2006-07 failed to materialise. Fortunately, AusAID stepped in with A$500,000 to allow 
the HI project to continue until the EC sub-Delegation arranged an alternative source of funding. 
 
The EC currently finances five UXO projects, all of which appear to be soundly conceived and 
promise to be effective: 
 
1. € 100,000 from the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) to COPE 
(a consortium of international NGOs) and the NRA for a national UXO victims survey 
2. € 500,000 from the thematic programme for Non-State Actors & Local Authorities (NSA-
LA) to HI for a UXO clearance and risk education project in Savannakhet 
3. € 500,000 from the thematic programme for Non-State Actors & Local Authorities to MAG 
for UXO clearance and institutional strengthening of provincial authorities in Khammoune 
4. € 150,000 from the NSA-LA programme to UXO Lao in support for its programme (risk 
education; survey; roving tasks/spot clearance; and area clearance) in Attapeu province, and 
5. € 150,000 from the NSA-LA programme to UXO Lao in support for its programme (risk 
education; survey; roving tasks/spot clearance; and area clearance) in Sekong province 
 
In spite of modest human and financial resources at its disposal, the EC sub-Delegation has done 
a good job in maintaining steady support for the UXO sector in Laos. This is relevant to the 
country’s need and in terms of both national development plans and the CSPs. Most support has 
gone to experienced and well-established INGOs which, for the most part, have implemented the 
projects effectively.8 The sub-Delegation – together with ECHO when it had an office in Laos – 
have been able to link relief, rehabilitation and development. 
 
                                                     
8 The two recent grants from the NSA-LA programme to UXO Lao represent the first time the EC has directly funded a 
state agency within the UXO sector. 
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The major issues for future EC support to the UXO sector in Laos are: 
 
• the APL thematic budget line has been terminated, and Laos is ineligible for the closest 
alternative (the Instrument for Stability) 
• the performance of the UXO sector has significantly increased in recent years 
• the Government has instituted reforms to further strengthen the UXO sector 
• both the NSEDP and the NGPES place priority on the UXO programme, which operates 
largely in the priority 47 very poor districts and is one of the three national poverty 
eradication programmes 
• increasing evidence suggests that UXO contamination accentuates poverty, while UXO 
clearance is correlated with poverty reduction 
• the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) was signed in Oslo by 94 countries, 
including Lao PDR (which was one of four countries that immediately ratified) 
 
Lacking much flexibility within its geographic envelope, the sub-delegation has shown ingenuity 
in obtaining modest amounts of funding for UXO sector. However, given that Lao PDR is a 
signatory of the CCM and the increased priority given to the UXO sector by the Government, the 
case for additional and increased EC funding is greatly strengthened.  
SRI LANKA 
 
Explosives contamination from mines and ERW stems from two decades of armed conflict 
between the government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE). International mine 
action funding began in the late 1990s and has waxed and waned in an inverse relationship to the 
level of conflict, reaching a peak during the 2002-06 ceasefire. Since then, most funding has been 
closely tied to the need to resettle people displaced by the conflict or by the December 2004 
tsunami.  
 
Since the February 2002 ceasefire, the EC has provided over € 14 million in funding for mine 
action. Until 2005, most EC funding came via ECHO. However, by early 2004, ECHO, RELEX 
and AIDCO had agreed that responsibility for funding mine action should be assumed by the 
latter two agencies.9 In 2004 RELEX began funding mine action projects in Sri Lanka, drawing 
both on the APL thematic budget line and that for Rehabilitation and Reconstruction in Favour of 
Asian Developing Countries. Since 2002, funding from both ECHO and RELEX has accounted 
for about 47% of the total, with only 6% coming from AIDCO’s geographic envelope for Sri 
Lanka.  
BURMA/MYANMAR 
The Burmese/Myanmar government forces and a number of ethnic armed groups continue to lay 
antipersonnel mines in significant numbers. Landmines are concentrated on its borders with 
Bangladesh, India and Thailand, and in eastern parts of the country. No humanitarian demining 
programs are known to exist, although there are reports of sporadic clearance by the military and 
of ‘village demining’ (i.e. informal demining), as well as ‘atrocity demining’ (e.g. civilians being 
forced to carry or remove mines against their will).  
 
In 2007, at least 438 new mine/ERW casualties were reported to Landmine Monitor, a significant 
increase from the 243 casualties reported in 2006. Operating in Thailand, the ICRC, Handicap 
International, and other international NGOs provide assistance to civilian war casualties and 
others with disabilities from Burma/Myanmar.  
                                                     
9 In 2005, following the tsunami, ECHO again funded some mine action projects, including € 800,000 for post-tsunami 
demining (survey and clearance) and € 200,000 for mine action technical assistance capacity in the field. In 2008 
ECHO again resumed funding to support demining in support of the resettlement of IDPs. 
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In 2003-04, the EC funded three mine action projects based in Thailand for people from Burma/ 
Myanmar. 
 
• € 500,000 to the ICRC for prosthetics, MRE and advocacy 
• € 200,000 in 2003 to HI for MRE and victim assistance, followed by another € 250,000 
the following year 
GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS10 
 
1. Should an enhanced mechanism be created for EC financial support to address explosives 
contamination problems, indicative programming allocations should be based mainly on the 
basis of needs and opportunities rather than the strategic importance of a country to the EU. 
 
2. The EC should advise ASEAN Foreign Ministers that its programme on Cooperation and 
Policy Reform in the Field of Security, which highlights border security, could address cross 
border demining/explosives ordnance disposal (EOD) initiatives when such actions are 
needed to allow the permanent demarcation of borders between ASEAN member states. 
 
3. In addition to the new Guidelines on European Community Mine Action, EC headquarters 
should identify and pre-qualify a roster of mine action experts who could provide technical 
advice to delegates in mine-affected countries who are responsible for mine action. 
 
4. In all explosives contaminated Asia-Pacific countries, the EC should meet with 
representatives from EU member states to agree who should take the lead in the mine action 
sector, in line with the EU Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labour. 
 
5. EC delegations, ideally in conjunction with donor representatives from EU member states in 
the country, should encourage and support programme-wide evaluations of national mine 
action programmes, and take the outcomes from such evaluations into consideration when 
making programming decisions. 
 
6. The EC should put a greater emphasis on the challenge of LRRD related to demining, and 
should consider a specific sub-strategy for demining and LRRD. Given the importance of 
ECHO funding in the early stages of many mine action programmes, DG ECHO should 
consider a focal point for mine action at its headquarters to achieve this aim. 
 
                                                     
10 See also the recommendations stemming from the Cambodia country case study. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
BACKGROUND 
 
In 2001 the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament adopted two Regulations on the 
reinforcement of the EU response against Antipersonnel Landmines (APL).11 These (referred to 
collectively as “the Regulation”) laid the foundation of the European integrated and focused 
policy. Article 13, paragraph 1 of the EC Regulation states that:  
 
“The Commission shall regularly assess operations financed by the Community in order 
to establish whether the objectives of the operations have been achieved and to provide 
guidelines for improving the effectiveness of future operations.” 
 
The APL Regulation goes on to state:  
 
“Every three years after entry into force of this Regulation, the Commission shall submit 
to the European Parliament an overall assessment of all Community mine actions (…).”
12 
 
The EC Mine Action Strategy and Multi-annual Indicative Programme, 2005-200713 further 
specifies that “more specific, geographic, evaluations of EC-funded mine actions, analysing the 
results and their impact” will be undertaken to complement the overall assessment. 
 
To implement these provisions, the EC: 
 
1. Commissioned a global assessment of EC mine policy and actions over the period 2002-
2004; 
2. Entered into an agreement with The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian 
Demining (GICHD) to, inter alia, manage the programme of regional evaluations to 
identify lessons learned within EC-funded mine action projects in the following regions: 
 
 Africa  Caucasus-Central Asia  Latin America 
 Asia-Pacific  Europe  Middle East 
 
The general objective of the Global Assessment was to determine to what extent the objectives 
and means set in the APL Regulation had been complied with and used in terms of strategy, 
programming, commitments and implementation. The Report from the Global Assessment was 
issued in March 2005,14 while the agreement with the GICHD was concluded in December that 
year.  
 
The regional evaluations complement the Global Assessment by focusing on:  
 
                                                     
11 Regulation (EC) 1724/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2001 concerning action against 
anti-personnel landmines in developing countries (OJ L 234, 1.9.2001, p.1) and Regulation (EC) 1725/2001 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2001 concerning action against anti-personnel landmines in third 
countries other than developing countries (OJ L 234, 1.9.2001, p.6). The provisions are similar and we quote from 
Regulation (EC) 1724/2001. 
12 Article 14 
13 This is the second strategy and multi-year indicative programme since the adoption of the EC Regulation: the first 
covered the period 2002-04.  
14 Gasser, Russell and Robert Keeley, Global Assessment of EC Mine Policy and Actions: 2002-2004. 
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(i) relevant conclusions and recommendations from the Global Assessment, and  
(ii) EC mine action strategy and programming issues at the country level.  
 
Thus, the evaluation does not assess the efficiency, effectiveness, and impact of individual 
projects, except to illustrate changes since the Global Assessment or critical programming 
issues.15  
 
Overall objective of the evaluation:  
 
To provide systematic and objective assessments of EC-funded mine action in the Asia-Pacific 
region to generate credible and useful lessons for decision-makers within the EC, allowing them 
to improve the planning and management of existing and future mine action projects, 
programmes, and policies. 
 
Specific objectives of the evaluation:  
 
• To assess the relevance of EC-funded mine activities vis-à-vis: 
 the geographic and thematic priorities defined in the Strategies for 2002-2004 and 
2005-2007; 
 national and regional needs, strategies, and priorities; 
 EC Country Strategy Papers and National Indicative Programmes for mine-affected 
countries in the Asia-Pacific region 2002-2007; 
 EC strategy documents for the Asia-Pacific region  
• To analyze the allocation of EC funds among mine-affected states in the Asia-Pacific region, 
and across the various components of mine action (survey, clearance, MRE, etc.);16 
• To assess the effectiveness of EC-funded mine action support in: 
 addressing the landmine & UXO problems in mine-affected partner countries 
 fostering national ownership and the development of local capacities; 
 supporting the overall development and rehabilitation priorities/programmes of the 
beneficiary countries;  
 supporting local mine action organisations; 
• To assess the coordination among the EC and other agencies supporting mine action in a 
country (regional; national; UN; donors; international NGOs; etc.); 
• To assess the impact of deconcentration on the planning and delivery of EC support to mine 
action in the Asia-Pacific region, including the capacity of EC delegations to assess 
proposals for mine action projects and to monitor/evaluate the implementation of these 
projects; 
• To asses the adequacy of the EC national strategies and plans, and the effectiveness of 
implementation; 
• To assess the existence of an ‘exit strategy’ for the country to graduate from donor 
assistance (including plans for sustainability); 
• To assess the linkages between mine action and other issues, such as humanitarian 
assistance, development, and armed violence reduction 
• To assess the impact of the end of the specific budget line for anti-personnel landmines and 
the introduction of the new “stability instrument” on future mine action support from the 
EC to the Asia-Pacific region; 
                                                     
15 For this evaluation, we made a more in-depth assessment of the mine action component of the ECOSORN project in 
Cambodia because it illustrated a number of critical programming issues. 
16 This question addresses, among other issues, the fact that “Commitment to the Mine Ban Treaty” is one of the 
criteria listed in the EC Mine Action Strategy 2005-2007 for determining geographic allocations.  
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• To make recommendations to improve the identification, design, and implementation of 
EC-funded mine projects; 
• To generate recommendations to enhance the opportunities for cross-fertilization among 
mine action programs in the Asia-Pacific region and globally. 
TERMS OF REFERENCE 
 
The full Terms of Reference (TOR) are attached as Appendix 1. 
METHODOLOGY 
 
The evaluation covered the period 2002 until today. Two countries in the region were selected for 
country missions, while others were covered only by a desk review.  
 
The evaluation was implemented in four phases: 
 
• Planning, desk research and data collection in Geneva 
• Country missions to Cambodia by Ted Paterson and Dr. Mao Vanna 
• Country mission to Laos by Ted Paterson and Erik Tollefsen  
• Analysis and reporting 
 
Ted Paterson, Erik Tollefsen (both GICHD) and Dr. Mao Vanna comprised the Evaluation Team. 
The key phases of the exercise were organized as follows: 
 
Country Timing Team Members 
18-29 Feb Ted Paterson & Mao Vanna Cambodia 
19-30 Apr
17
 Ted Paterson & Mao Vanna 
Interviews in Bangkok 1 May Ted Paterson 
Lao PDR 14-29 June Ted Paterson & Erik Tollefsen 
 
As the evaluation did not focus on the performance of individual projects, Evaluation Team 
members spent most of their time in capitals and major centres for meetings and to collect 
documents and data from: 
 
• EC sub-delegations and the Bangkok delegation 
• the ECHO office in Bangkok  
• national authorities and officials from national mine action centres 
• UN agencies supporting mine action 
• representatives from other major donors to mine action in that country 
• representatives from mine action operators  
• other government officials  
 
The Evaluation Team undertook brief field visits to: 
 
• Siem Reap in Cambodia to the main project offices of the Economic and Social Re-launch of 
the Northwest Provinces (ECOSORN) project 
                                                     
17 The April mission was undertaken mainly for a different project, but the Team undertook a few follow-up meetings 
related to the EC regional evaluation. 
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• Savannakhet Province in Lao PDR to visit the field offices and operations of Handicap 
International-Belgium (HI-B)  
• Khammuone Province in Lao PDR to visit the field offices and operations of and Mines 
Advisory Group (MAG) 
 
Additional information was obtained from: 
  
• The review of:  
• EC CSP and National Indicative Programmes (NIP) 
• Project documents (project proposals, final reports, evaluations, etc., where 
available) 
• National Development Plans, Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, and National 
Mine Action Strategies 
• Recent mine action evaluations commissioned by other agencies 
• Other standard sources of mine action information (e.g. Landmine Monitor 
Reports) 
• A questionnaire survey with 20 questions and a scale ranking from 1 (unimportant issue) to 
6 (extremely important issue)  
 
The evaluation team used the standard development evaluation criteria as defined by the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/Development Assistance Committee 




The only significant constraint in this study was the limited availability of certain types of 
documents (Requests for Proposals; contracts and grant agreements; etc.).  
 
It is also necessary to acknowledge that the completion of the regional evaluation took far longer 
than anticipated. This stemmed from factors that delayed the Laos country mission and the 
finalisation of the Cambodia country mission report, coupled with the fact that the evaluation 
team leader was over-committed in terms of work obligations in the second half of 2008.  
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2. GENERAL FINDINGS 
OVERVIEW OF EC FUNDED MINE ACTION SUPPORT 
TOTAL EC MINE ACTION FUNDING TO THE REGION 
For the periods covered by the two EC APL Strategies, total EC funding to mine action in the 
Asia-Pacific region fell somewhat, both in absolute terms (a 30% drop from € 13.6 million to € 
9.4 million) and as a percentage of global total of EC-funding to mine action. 
  
Table 1 – Mine Action funding to the Asia-Pacific 
Period Total EC Mine Action 
Funding 




pre-2002 n.a. € 10.3 million -- 
2002-2004 € 145.2 million € 13.6 million 9.6% 
2005-2007 € 141.1 million € 9.4 million 6.7% 
2008 n.a. € 2.5 million -- 
Sources: Total EC funding – Landmine Monitor 2003-2008; Funding for Asia-Pacific – our data. 
 
This is a very modest amount given the scale of the problem in the region.18 By any measure, 
Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam are among the top 10 countries in the world in terms of the impact 
of explosives contamination. Burma/Myanmar had the second highest number of civilian 
landmine/UXO casualties in the world in 2007 (after Afghanistan). Sri Lanka has less 
contamination and fewer casualties, but is in the midst of conflict and the contamination 
exacerbates the difficulties faced by the many internally displaced persons (IDPs), as well as 
reconstruction efforts in former LTTE-controlled areas now under Government control.  
 
Significant albeit declining funding was provided during both periods covered by the EC 
Strategies from both ECHO and the APL thematic budget lines. In the second period, large sums 
were provided for mine action from a variety of global or regional thematic programmes.19 
Throughout the 2002-2007 period, no EC funding for mine action appears to have come from the 
country envelopes. 
























                                                     
18 In contrast, Angola received € 47.7 million from the EC for mine action from 2002-07 – more than double the 
amount the EC provided to the entire Asia-Pacific region. 
19 In Sri Lanka for example, 19 10 04 – Rehabilitation and Reconstruction in Favour of Asian Developing Countries. 
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Total EC mine action funding to Asia-Pacific actually exceeded the modest targets set in the two 
APL Strategies, although allocations from the APL budget line itself were below the amounts 
shown in the indicative programmes for both periods. 
 
Table 2 – Targets and actual funding for mine action (EUR millions) 
Target Actual % Variance  
APL Total APL Total APL Total 
2002-2004 € 4.9 € 10.8 € 4.6 € 13.6 94% 126% 
2005-2007 € 5.1 € 5.1 € 2.3 € 9.4 45% 184% 
ALLOCATIONS OF MINE ACTION FUNDING  
Allocations among countries 
Since 2002, the bulk of all EC mine action funding to Asia-Pacific countries has been allocated to 
Sri Lanka – 61% compared to 21% for Laos, 14% to Cambodia, and 4% to Burma/Myanmar.  
 
Figure 2 – Allocation of funding by country       
In part, this pattern reflects the fact 
that Sri Lanka has been eligible for 
ECHO funding for the entire period 
since 2002, and that ECHO has been 
the most important source of funding 
(44% of the € 25.6 million total – see 
second pie chart). But even excluding 
ECHO funds, Sri Lanka received 
53% of EC mine action funding to 
the region since 2002, with Laos 
receiving 28%, Cambodia 15% and 
Burma/ Myanmar 4%. 
 
Figure 3 – Source of funds since 2002   
This allocation is hard to 
reconcile with the scope of the 
problems in the countries 
concerned. Measured by extent 
of contamination, Cambodia and 
Laos are certainly far more 
contaminated than Sri Lanka 
(and Burma/Myanmar may be as 
well). Measured by the numbers 
of casualties, Burma/Myanmar, 
Cambodia and Laos are all far 
more impacted than is Sri 
Lanka.20 Of the four countries 
that received EC mine action 
funding, only Cambodia is a signatory to the APMBC. 
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The following chart provides the pattern of EC mine action funding to Asia-Pacific countries for 
as far back as we have obtained figures. What stands out most dramatically is that almost no 
funding for mine action in Asia-Pacific has come from the EC country envelopes. About 39% 
came from ECHO, 19% from the APL budget line, and 39% from other budget lines (regional or 
thematic) or thematic programmes (such as Non-States Actors and Local Authorities). 












2002-04 2005-07 2008 pre-
2002
2002-04 2005-07 2008 pre-
2002
2002-04 2005-07 2008 pre-
2002
2002-04 2005-07 2008










Country ECHO Thematic APL
 
Note: ‘Thematic’ refers both to various regional budget lines and thematic programmes 
 
More fundamentally, except in the case of Sri Lanka, EC mine action assistance to these countries 
in the period covered by this evaluation (2002-to date) has been extremely modest given the scale 
of their explosive contamination problems, whether measured in absolute and relative terms. In 
particular, EC mine action assistance in recent years has been marginal in both Cambodia and 
Laos, even though these countries have mine/UXO problems that greatly exceed those faced by 
many countries that have received far more substantial mine action funding from the EC.21 
   


























                                                     
21 One of the principal conclusions of the Global Assessment on EU Mine Action Strategy was the need for a 
transparent process for determining which countries and projects receive EC funding for mine action. This issue will be 
explored in detail within the Synthesis Report on the Evaluation of EC Support to Mine Action, planned for 2009. 
22 From Landmine Monitor (various years) with adjustments to correct clear cases of incorrect reports of EC funding. 
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Allocation across mine action components23 
Since 2002, most EC mine action funding went to demining, although the percentage for this 
(59% of the total) is lower 
than might be expected given 
the overall expenditure 
patterns for mine action in 
these countries (typically 75% 
or more of total expenditures 
are on demining). 
 
The EC has provided very 
significant sums for victim 
assistance (VA – 17% of all 
mine action funding since 
2002). The bulk of these 
funds are likely for general 
disability programmes that may target, but are not restricted to, landmine and UXO survivors. 
Allocations among different types of recipient agencies 
 
Figure 6 – Funding by type of recipient 
The bulk of EC mine action funding (at 
least 60%24) since 2002 has gone to 
international NGOs (INGO), most of 
which are based in an EU member 
state. UN agencies have received at 
least 20% (all in Sri Lanka), and 
smaller amounts have been granted to 
humanitarian NGOs and the ICRC. A 
paltry 6% has gone to national 
organisations, and the bulk of this was 
via a sub-contract issued by the 
ECOSORN project.25 
 
                                                     
23 Many projects support more than one type of mine action. Calculations are based on what appears to be the principal 
purpose of each project. 
24 We could not determine the recipient of 9% of the EC funding, so the other percentages are given as ‘at least’. 
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3. COUNTRY FINDINGS 
CAMBODIA26 
CONTEXT 
Cambodia is one of the countries most affected by explosives contamination,27 stemming from: 
 
• The Vietnam War, when the U.S. dropped 
enormous quantities of bombs in the north-east to 
interdict Vietcong and North Vietnamese forces 
along the Ho Chi Minh trail, and subsequently 
conducted a clandestine invasion, bringing 
Cambodia into the conflict, leading ultimately to 
the overthrow of the U.S.-backed regime by the 
Khmer Rouge (KR) in 1975; 
• The 1979 invasion by the Vietnamese to overthrow 
the KR, leading to a protracted war between the 
Vietnamese-backed regime and the KR which did 
not fully end until 1998. The Vietnamese-backed 
regime in used forced labour to lay the 600 km ‘K-
5’ minefield along the border with Thailand, where 
the KR had taken refuge. In turn, the KR dug-up 
Vietnamese landmines and laid their own minefields. Thus, the bulk of the landmine 
contamination – including the K-5 belt of minefields – is in the north-western provinces;28 
• While the large minefields are concentrated along the north-western borders, and the heaviest 
concentration of ERW is in the north-east, the extended conflicts resulted in contamination 
throughout much of the country. The Landmine Impact Survey (2000-02) surveyed almost 
14,000 communities and found 1,640 (12%) were impacted by mines, and another 5,500 
(almost 40%) affected by ERW. In total, the LIS identified 3,037 suspected hazards areas, 
amounting to 4,466 km² (2.5% of the country).29 
 
The extensive contamination, coupled with internal migration to the heavily mine-affected areas 
following the end of the war30 and the growth in the scrap-metal trade (leading to ‘harvesting’ 
UXO), led to extremely high numbers of casualties – almost constant at about 800/year from 
2000-2005. In 2006, however, the number of casualties fell by almost 50% (see graph).31 
HISTORY OF THE MINE ACTION PROGRAMME32 
Mine action began in Cambodia in 1992 under the United Nations Transitional Authority in 
Cambodia (UNTAC). When the UNTAC mandate ended in late 1993, the Cambodian Mine 
Action Centre (CMAC) became the key national organization, serving as both the national mine 
action centre (MAC) and the largest operator. In addition, international NGOs established 
                                                     
26 From Paterson and Mao Vanna, 2008, Cambodia Mission Report 
27 Explosives contamination includes landmines and other explosive remnants of war (ERW). ERW comprises 
unexploded ordnance (UXO) and abandoned ordnance (AXO).  
28 Battambang, Banteay Meanchey, Oddar Meanchey and Preah Vihear, along with the Pailin municipality. 
29 It is agreed that the actual contamination will prove to be far lower than this figure (perhaps only 10%).  
30 New migrants are unfamiliar with minefield locations, and may be forced to settle contaminated areas. 
31 A further 22% fall in casualties occurred in 2007; rates in the 1st quarter of 2008 are down another 15%. 
32 Cambodia signed the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) in December 1997 and ratified it in July 1999. 
The Treaty entered into force in January 2000.  
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programmes, with HALO Trust and Mines Advisory Group (MAG) still implementing large 
demining operations,33 and Handicap International Belgium (HI-B) supporting the Cambodian 
Mine Victim Information System (CMVIS).  
 












CMAC was rocked by a corruption scandal in 1998-99, resulting in the resignation of its Director 
and a drop in funding. It has since recovered and dramatically enhanced its performance. 
However, it no longer serves as the national MAC; a role assumed by the Cambodian Mine 
Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA), established in 2000. 
 
Formally, the CMAA is a inter-governmental body of high-level officials chaired by the Prime 
Minister. However, the CMAA Council has never met and only the general secretariat functions. 
The Secretary-General is the same individual who resigned in the aftermath of the CMAC 
corruption scandal. Accordingly, CMAA has received only modest donor support and has never 
adequately discharged its responsibilities. Of particular concern, it has not recorded the survey 
and clearance work done by the operators, which means it does not have the information needed 
to formulate national strategies and plans as a basis for coordination.34 
 
In 2004, the Royal Cambodia Government (RCG) also established a government-donor Technical 
Working Group (TWG) on Mine Action as part of the country’s overall aid coordination 
mechanisms.35  
 
In 2004, a number of donors and the UNDP commissioned a joint evaluation of Cambodia’s mine 
action programme.36 It recommended that CMAA focus on a limited number of responsibilities, 
transferring to other ministries responsibility for MRE, victim assistance, post-clearance land use, 
and the mine and ERW mapping/database functions. These recommendations have never been 
implemented and the functions remain weak within the CMAA.37  
 
Mine Action Planning Units (MAPU) represent an important innovation in Cambodia’s mine 
                                                     
33 In addition, the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF) conducts demining for its own purposes and in support of 
large infrastructure projects financed by the Asian Development Bank, the World Bank, and bilateral donors. There are 
also a number of private demining firms, and extensive ‘village demining’.  
34 The main operators maintain their own databases, and CMAA – with the support of NPA – committed to compiling 
all contamination and clearance data into a single database by mid-August 2008. 
35 The TWG is chaired by a Minister of State, who also serves as the Vice-President of the CMAA. 
36 Griffen and Keeley, 2004, Joint Evaluation of Mine Action in Cambodia. 
37 The evaluation also recommended competitive tendering. UNDP established a new Clearing for Results trust fund for 
this purpose. However, it appears it will not move to competitive tendering, for reasons discussed later.   
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action programme. These were originally established as Land Use Planning Units (LUPU) with a 
dual role: (i) assisting communities in establishing clearance preferences and (ii) ensuring the 
intended beneficiaries actually received the land. However, a new Land Law in 2001 clarified that 
the Ministry of Land Management, Urban Planning and Construction (MLMUPC) is responsible 
for land titling. The MLMUPC did not recognise the land allocations organised by LUPU. On the 
verge of collapse, LUPU were reorganised as MAPU, without the land use planning function.   
 
MAPU became the lynchpin in a three-tiered mechanism to establish community preferences for 
demining. Throughout the year, MAPU work at the village and commune levels to review 
demining requirements. Annually, they facilitate district workshops at which commune 
preferences are aggregated into district preference rankings. These are then aggregated into 
provincial mine action plans by Provincial Mine Action Committees (PMAC). Understandably, 
the mechanism has experienced some teething problems, but has been improving over time. 
 
The Cambodia mine action programme also features a number of initiatives that incorporate mine 
action within development projects. The largest of these is the EC-funded Economic and Social 
Relaunch of the Northwest Provinces in Cambodia (ECOSORN), an EC-funded integrated rural 
development (IRD) project that is discussed in a following section.  
 
In brief, since the corruption scandal in 1999, a very decentralised system for mine action has 
evolved in Cambodia. Most of the funds for demining are in the hands of the operators, which 
gives them significant independence to determine their priorities. Increasingly however, the 
operators are selecting tasks from the preference lists established by the ‘bottom-up’ MAPU 
process. Priorities are also established by a number of community development and IRD projects 
that incorporate mine action components, and by the UNDP-managed Clearing for Results 
project, which adopts preferences established via the MAPU process.38 Casualties are seen by all 
groups as a key criterion for setting priorities, and the CMVIS provides very good data on these. 
MINE ACTION IN NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES 
The "Rectangular Strategy" (July 2004) is the manifesto of the Royal Government of Cambodia 
(RGC).39 It has four axes –  social stability; regional and international integration; partnership 
with the international community and the private sector; and macro-economic development – 
with Good Governance at the core. Agriculture is one of the priority sectors identified in the 
strategy, and both landmine clearance and land reform are explicitly mentioned as requirements 
for agricultural development. 
 
In early 2006, the RGC adopted a National Strategic Development Plan 2006-2010 (NSDP), 
which serves as the country’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) and lays out how the 
Rectangular Strategy is to be implemented. The NSDP is also linked tightly with Cambodia’s 
Millennium Development Goals (MDG). The government added a 9th MDG covering de-mining, 
UXO and victim assistance,40 which included targets for 2005, 2010, and 2015, as follows: 
 
                                                     
38 There is also a large Community-based Mine Risk Reduction (CBMRR) network of community volunteers and 
district coordinators, managed by CMAC. These can be an excellent source of mine action information. 
39 This will be updated by the government elected in mid-2008, but may not change greatly as the same party has 
formed the Government, under the same Prime Minister. 
40 Landmines and UXO are also mentioned in a number of places in the NSDP. 
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Table 3 – Mine action targets in NSDP & MDGs 
 Actual  Targets 
Indicator 2005 2005 2010 2015 
1. Annual victims 797 500 < 200 0 
2. % suspected hazard cleared 50.3% 51% 77% 100% 
3. Develop comprehensive victim assistance framework by 2007 
 
EC SUPPORT FOR CAMBODIA  
The EC has only a small sub-Delegation in Phnom Penh, reporting to the Delegation in Bangkok, 
and a relatively modest development assistance programme in Cambodia, averaging $25 million/ 
year in 2005-06. Given this, EC Country Strategy Papers (CSP) and Indicative Programmes (NIP, 
then MIP)41 have focussed on a limited number of programming areas (rural development; social 
services; governance).  
 
The most recent CSP and MIP states that the EC will channel its assistance mainly through sector 
support programmes, plus general budget support via the a pooled funding mechanism led by the 
World Bank. This represents continued evolution towards a simpler programming structure. It 
also reflects reforms to EU aid policies more generally: deconcentration (more authority to the 
Delegations) and decentralisation (more responsibility to the partner countries to promote national 
ownership). As well, in line with the Paris Declaration, ‘centralised’ projects managed by the EC 
on behalf of the recipient government are being phased-out, with the bulk of assistance provided 
via sector support and general budget support.  
  
In addition, EU donors in Cambodia have issued a European Road Map for Increased Aid 
Effectiveness in Cambodia.
42 Among other actions, the Road Map seeks to enhance the Technical 
Working Groups (TWG) through increased EU participation, co-ordination of EU positions, and 
systems of mutual representation.  
 
Textbox 1 – The EU Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labour 
Following a commitment in 2006 to improve the division of labour in EU development assistance, 
both within and across countries, the EU adopted a number of guiding principles in May 2007: 
 
In country: 
1. Each EU donor to work in a maximum of three sectors per partner country  
2. Redeploy funds programmed for other sectors  
3. EU to support the establishment of lead donor arrangements in all priority sectors. 
4. “Delegated cooperation” (one donor delegating another to administer its funding in a given 
sector) is encouraged. 
5. EU to ensure involvement of at least one donor in every sector relevant for poverty reduction. 
EU donors to limit number of active donors per sector to maximum of five. 
 
Cross-country or regional 
6. Principles 1-5 also to be applied at regional levels. 
7. EU donors to focus on a limited number of “priority countries. 
8. EU donors also commit to address the ‘aid orphans’ issues. 
                                                     
41 Starting in 2007, the name of these changed from National Indicative Programmes (NIP) to Multi-Annual Indicative 
Programmes (MIP). 
42 This is in line with the European Consensus on Development (2005), Cambodia’s Aid Effectiveness Plan, and the 
EU Code of Conduct on Complementarity and the Division of Labour (2007). 
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Complementary principles: 
9. EU donors deepen self-assessments and evaluations as regards their comparative 
advantages in sectors and aid modalities. 
10. The EU commits to make progress on other dimensions of complementarity, vertical 
complementarity, and cross-modalities and instruments. 
11. Successful implementation requires political and technical support at both the headquarter 
and field levels.  
 
Sources: 
The EU Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labour,  
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/07/st09/st09558.en07.pdf  
ActionAid & ECDPM, Whither EC Aid, 2008 
 
ECHO provided significant assistance following the 1991 Paris Peace Accords but, since 2004, it 
has scaled down and now restricts itself to its natural disaster preparedness/mitigation programme 
(DIPECHO), plus the EC Food Security Programme (a global programme). As well, the latest 
MIP indicates that the EC country programme could be supplemented by initiatives financed 
under the regional programme for Asia (see textbox) and under other thematic programmes.43 
 
Textbox 2 – Relevant issues in the MIP for Asia: 2007-2010 
For potential mine action initiatives, the most likely component of the MIP for Asia is called 
ASEAN Cooperation and Policy Reform in the Security Field. Its overall objective is to support 
cooperation and reform in the security field, mainly through a more coherent system of Border 
Management. More specifically it is meant to strengthen the capacities of the ASEAN Border 
Management system both at regional cooperation level and at selected Border Crossings.  
 
In Cambodia’s case, much of the explosives contamination is in the north-west (bordering 
Thailand) and the east (bordering Vietnam). In both cases, the contamination straddles the 
border. As well, Cambodia has unresolved border disputes with both neighbours, including the 
politically contentious dispute with Thailand over the Preah Vihear temple. More generally, the 
border dispute has hampered clearance operations along the massive K-5 mine belt. A resolution 
of this border dispute would enhance regional security and facilitate landmine clearance of the 
most heavily contaminated areas in both Cambodia and Thailand. 
EC ASSISTANCE FOR MINE ACTION 
From 1998 to date, we have identified 20 EC-funded mine action projects for Cambodia, totalling 
just over € 10,275,000.44 
Before 2002 
The EC provided support to mine action in Cambodia prior to the release of the first EC mine 
action strategy in 2002. Records suggest the EC provided about € 6.6 million from 1998 though 
2002. Over half of this funding (58%) appears to have come from special budget lines for 
rehabilitation and reconstruction in developing countries (B7-6410 and B7-5076), with the 
remainder provided by ECHO. Most EC funding was provided in support of demining operations, 
but a significant amount was provided for capacity development for CMAC, CMAA, and Land 
Use Planning Units (LUPU). 
                                                     
43 Identified thematic areas are democracy & human rights; non-state actors in development; security, migration & 
asylum; human & social development; and environment and sustainable management of natural resources. 
44 The list of EC-funded mine action projects in Cambodia is provided in Appendix 4. 
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Since 2002 
Since 2002, slightly more than half of the € 3.65 million in new EC mine action funding 
commitments to Cambodia have been provided by ECHO. A number of these were evaluated in 
2003, with very positive results (Durocher et al, 2003 – see textbox). Since 2004 however, ECHO 
has restricted its programming in Cambodia to disaster preparedness projects (DIPECHO). 
 
Textbox 3 – Evaluation of ECHO-funded Mine Action Projects in Cambodia 
The Evaluation Team obtained a report on three ECHO-funded pilot risk reduction projects 
conducted by HALO Trust, MAG, and HI-B/CMAC. (Durocher et al) While noting start-up 
difficulties in each project, the evaluators concluded (p. 159): 
 
“…all three casualty and risk reduction projects have carried out significant interventions that will greatly 
benefit the villagers in the villages in which they intervened. The high degree of villager satisfaction with the 
interventions is a good indication that these projects are on the right track…Additional support will ensure 
that these initiatives attain their full potential and that the mine/UXO casualty and risk reduction models and 
methodologies developed by these three projects will have a significant impact on mine action programs in 
Cambodia and elsewhere.” 
 
The authors of the ECHO evaluation also concluded that “The most important factor [in ongoing 
high mine/UXO casualty rates] has undoubtedly been the migration of people into highly mine/UXO 
contaminated areas …Therein lies the challenge for the humanitarian demining agencies…identifying areas 
with significant recent population migrations and truncating the casualty profile with appropriate 
interventions; and identifying areas where there will be significant migrations in the near future and applying 
proactive preemptive measures.” (p. 156) 
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CSP 2000-03 and NIP: 2002-04 
The NIP 2002-2004 included € 20 million for ECOSORN – an IRD project in the mine-affected 
provinces in the north-west (discussed later in this report). The NIP also specified € 5 million for 
demining. However, the EC subsequently decided not to provide the € 5 million directly to the 
mine action sector. Instead, these funds were added to ECOSORN to finance an additional Safer 
Access to Land (SAL) ‘result’ covering both mine action and land titling.  
 
The decision not to proceed with a standalone € 5 million demining project appears to have 
stemmed from dissatisfaction with the results achieved with earlier EC funding to CMAC and 
CMAA. In 2000, EC headquarters had approved about € 860,000 in dedicated mine action 
funding for Cambodia. Originally, this was intended for CMAC (then, the national MAC). In 
light of the CMAC corruption scandal, € 360,000 was awarded instead to Handicap International-
Belgium (HI-B) to provide support to the LUPU in two provinces, with the remainder awarded to 
two firms to provide long- and short-term technical assistance to the newly-established CMAA.  
 
Following passage of the 2001 Land Law, LUPU lost authority to allocate demined land to target 
beneficiaries, and HI-B decided not to continue its support.45 As well, progress at CMAA was 
discouraging.46 Following discussions, the Vice President of CMAA’s Governing Council wrote 
the EC in July 2003 requesting the € 5 million planned for mine action be allocated as follows: 
 
• € 3.5 million to CMAC for demining 
• € 1.0 million to an NGO to support the LUPU/MAPU mechanism 
• € 0.5 million for assistance to CMAA 
 
However, in late 2003 the EC Sub-delegation commissioned an exercise covering (i) an 
Evaluation of the TA Project with the CMAA and (ii) a Review of the Mine Action Sector.47 The 
evaluation of the TA project concluded: “CMAA has struggled to meet some of its responsibilities 
and many of the EC project objectives have not been fully achieved. This has been mainly due to 
the lack of assistance and support given to the EC TA’s [sic] from the Secretary General.” (p. 6) 
 
Among the recommendations from the sector review were that (i) donors should increase support 
to MRE48 and (ii) the ECOSORN project should receive dedicated mine action support.49 As a 
result, the € 5 million originally programmed for CMAC in the NIP for 2002-04 was reallocated 
to ECOSORN to finance mine action and other ‘safer access to land’ activities. 
 
CSP: 2004-06 and NIP: 2005-06 
The CSP 2004-06 noted that Cambodia was eligible for funding from a number of EC horizontal 
budget lines, including that for anti-personnel mines. The EC Mine Action Strategy for 2002-
2004 had indicated € 500,000 for support to capacity building in CMAA, but this was not used. 
Again, this may reflect concerns with the leadership of CMAA.  
 
                                                     
45 See Bolton et al, 2003, LUPU Project Evaluation. 
46 In addition, there were concerns that Government had appointed the individual implicated in CMAC’s corruption 
scandal of 1998-99 as the Secretary General of CMAA.  
47 ArmorGroup 2003a and 2003b. 
48 This recommendation based on the claim the MRE had reduced in recent years which is likely to result in an increase 
in victims in the near future.”(p. 34) Such an increase did not occur and, in 2006, the number of victims fell by 50%. 
See Bottomley et al, 2007.   
49 This recommendation had, in fact, been presaged in the EC CSP for 2004-06: However, experience has shown that 
constraints to access to land due to UXO and landmine contamination is [sic] better addressed from a rural 
development perspective, rather than a purely humanitarian response as they can be major obstacles to the 
implementation of rural development programmes. (p. 28) 
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The EC Mine Action Strategy for 2005-2007 indicated € 1.5 million in 2006-07 for Cambodia 
from the thematic budget line for mine action and, in 2007, the EC Delegation issued a call for 
proposals. Subsequently, two grant agreements of € 500,000 each were awarded for victim 
assistance projects to: 
 
1. Instituto de Estudios Políticos para América Latina y África (IEPALA), partnered with 
Cambodian War Amputees Rehabilitation Society (CWARS) 
2. Handicap International, France (HI-F)  
 
CSP 2007-2013 and MIP 2007-2010 
The CSP highlights a number of development constraints in Cambodia including landmine and 
other ERW contamination. However, the NIP provided no country funds for mine action. 
Current EC-funded Mine Action Projects 
 
ECOSORN 
The EC conducted mission in mid-2000 and mid-2003 that resulted in a € 20 million integrated 
rural development (IRD) project with four ‘envisaged results’ (i.e. components):50  
 
• Agricultural, livestock and fisheries production  
• Off-farm economic and employment activities (including microfinance) 
• Community empowerment 
• Rural access to roads, potable water and sanitation 
 
However, one of the outcomes of the mine action sector review commissioned by the EC in late 
2003 was that the € 5 million planned for mine action should not proceed as a standalone project; 
instead it should be a component of the IRD project. Accordingly, ECOSORN was redesigned as 
a € 25 million initiative with mine action incorporated into a fifth component for safer access to 
land (SAL), ‘…through the provision of land title, installation of a sustainable capacity at the 
commune level for a mine risk education programme fully integrated with commune development 
plans, and necessary mine clearance activities.’  
 
Project activities got underway in December 2005. ECOSORN is to last five years, but the first 
two years focus on detailed design, preparation and issuance of tender documents, and contracting 
with the successful bidders.51 (As well, 80 ‘Quick Impact Projects’ were implemented, including 
20 for the SAL component, of which seven related to mine action.52) Thus, there are only three 
years to implement the main activities – a remarkably short period for a complex IRD project. 
 
The Safer Access to Land (SAL) Component 
The SAL components posed a number of problems for the ECOSORN project task force (PTF). 
First, the plans for this component were not properly elaborated in the financing agreement. There 
are only 13 lines of text describing all aspects, embracing demining, MRE, and land titling plus 
                                                     
50 ECOSORN focuses on 90 target villages in 40 communes in Battambang, Banteay Meanchey, and Siem Reap 
provinces. It is managed by a ‘project task force’ (a project implementation unit under the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fisheries [MAFF], supported a team of technical advisors). 
51 In EC parlance, this is termed the D+3 rule. EC procedures for external operations require that all sub-contracts 
(‘contracts implementing the financing agreement’) be signed within three years of the budgetary commitment by the 
Commission. For ECOSORN, this meant that all sub-contracts had to be signed by 16 November 2007. Given lags 
between the passage of the budgetary commitment and the project start-up, project management units typically have 
only two years to complete detailed design, preparation of tender documents, issuing requests for proposal, selecting 
winning bids, and negotiating/signing contracts. 
52 Under the original financing agreement, the maximum value of each of these was € 5,000.  
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capacity development of communes and – perhaps – ‘village deminers’ or informal demining 
firms. Second, there was no provision in the project agreement for technical assistance in either 
demining and land titling. The PTF recognised this problem and sought approval from the EC 
Delegation in Bangkok to engage four local TAs,53 who were in place by early 2007. 
 
Third, the districts and communes to be covered by ECOSORN had been identified during the 
formulation mission in mid-2003, prior to the decision to merge the mine action project into 
ECOSORN. Thus, the presence of landmine contamination was not considered when determining 
the project’s geographic scope, and it was unclear how many communities were mine-impacted.54   
 
Fourth, links between the MAFF and the mine action community are not well established, and 
each had evolved very different approaches to needs analysis, priority-setting, planning, and 
implementation. ECOSORN did attempt to bridge the gap with two workshops in an attempt to 
elaborate the mine action work. However, these efforts do not appear to have bridged the ‘cultural 
divide’ between the mine action community and ECOSORN’s rural development specialists.55  
 
Tendering for the mine action sub-component56 
In spite of these problems in determining the detailed design of mine action activities, preparation 
of the tender documents proceeded. All the tenders for the mine action and land titling sub-
components were drawn-up by a consultant land surveyor who had expertise on land management 
issues in Cambodia but, it appears, not on mine action. Ultimately, the TOR for the mine action 
sub-component contained a number of specifications that caused uncertainty among potential 
bidders.  
 
The most serious concern related to the target area for either de-mining or clearance. On page 11 
of the TOR, it is specified as de-mining of 400 ha of land…; on page 23, the first of the indicators 
is Minimum of 400 hectares of contaminated land…cleared. The performance indicator in the 
Logical Framework Matrix states 300 ha arable land cleared. (emphasis added) ‘De-mining’ and 
‘clearance’ are not equivalent terms. In the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) and 
other foundation documents within the mine action field: 
• ‘clearance’ means full intrusive inspection of 100% of the specified area with manual 
deminers and/or machines and/or explosives detection dogs or devices backed by manual 
deminers, with a goal of locating and destroying 100% of all devices to a specified depth.  
• ‘de-mining’ comprises survey and marking as well as clearance.  
 
The costs of different demining activities in Cambodia vary significantly, from fractions of a cent 
per square meter57 to an average of perhaps $1 per m2 or more for clearance. If clearance was the 
intent, the cost for 400 ha. would have been in the neighbourhood of $4 million or more – well 
over double the € 1.173 million budgeted for this lot. A difference of this magnitude should 
probably have halted the tender process until prospective bidders could be assured of the target 
                                                     
53 There are 1 senior and 1 junior local technical advisor for both demining and land titling.  
54 Following the commencement of the project, participatory planning led to the identification of 90 target villages, 
selected principally on the basis of agricultural development criteria. Landmine contamination was listed as a medium- 
to high-priority in only a few villages. Source: meeting with ECOSORN PTF, 20 February 2008.  
55 In retrospect, part of the problem seems simply that the mine action personnel did not fathom the logic behind the 
D+3 approach to project implementation.  
56 The sub-component was divided into two ‘Lots’, covering de-mining and MRE respectively. No contract for the 
MRE lot was awarded. We do not discuss the MRE lot further in this report – see the Cambodia Mission Report for 
details. 
57 For non-intrusive survey inspections to document that areas recorded as suspected hazards are unlikely to contain 
explosive devices. In Cambodia, this process is termed ‘land reclassification’. One operator reported that this costs an 
average of $0.0003/m2.  
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outputs. However, under EC regulations, all ECOSORN contracting had to be signed by 16 
November 2007 (the D+3 rule). There was no time to revise and reissue the tender.  
 
In the end, ECOSORN received only one proposal for this lot. CMAC submitted the bid (which 
includes ‘institutional support’ to government agencies involved in the determination of demining 
priorities) and it was accepted. It proposed clearance of 200 ha. and ‘area reduction’ of 200 ha.58  
 
The Evaluation Team was advised that a contract for Victim Assistance has been issued to the 
German firm ABU. However, of this € 791,512 contract, only € 150,000 from the SAL 
component budget will go specifically to assist landmine survivors. 
  
Activities since the Contract Award for Demining 
In the first days following the award of contract, the key demining expert assigned by CMAC 
recommended to ECOSORN management that risk reduction measures (MRE for ECOSORN and 
sub-contractor personnel plus survey of all planned rural infrastructure works) be undertaken 
immediately. This recommendation was not acted upon straight away, apparently because (i) 
CMAC’s work plan had not been approved by the EC, so no work under the demining sub-
component would be authorised for reimbursement, and (ii) the schedules for the infrastructure 
works had not provided for MRE for sub-contractor staff or further survey of the planned works. 
 
By January 2008, some of the civil engineering sub-contractors were already working on roads 
and infrastructure. In February, an equipment operator working on road rehabilitation in 
Battambang went off the road surface, drove into a suspected minefield (reportedly driving over a 
number of minefield markers) and exposed an anti-tank mine, which did not explode. ECOSORN 
personnel contacted CMAC, which sent a rapid response team to the site, where it located another 
four anti-tank mines. Had the original antitank mine detonated, the equipment would have been 
completely destroyed and the operator almost certainly killed, while others in the vicinity could 
have been killed or injured. Had the other anti-tank mines exploded, the damage would have been 
correspondingly greater.59 
 
We understand that the civil engineering personnel at ECOSORN had checked with CMAC and 
the relevant MAPUs about the possibility of explosives contamination on planned work sites. We 
understand that ECOSORN personnel had been advised that the road in question had been 
cleared. However, the clearance standard for ‘opening’ a tertiary road was six meters on both 
sides of the centre line. This is adequate to allow the road surface to be used, but is inadequate for 
safe rehabilitation or reconstruction.60  
 
Clearly, these incidents could have had tragic consequences, as demonstrated by other anti-tank 
mine incidents in Cambodia at about the same time which resulted in the death of two workers 
and serious injuries to others, the destruction of a water tanker, truck, and excavator, and the 
stoppage of a large road reconstruction project. 
 
The Decision to Issue a Competitive Tender for Demining 
The Evaluation Team has other concerns over the decision to proceed with a competitive tender 
for the demining services. There were three potential bidders that clearly could manage a project 
                                                     
58 Area reduction is only loosely defined in the CMAA Area Reduction Policy. CMAC advised the team that it would 
use processes that would cost between one-third and two-thirds the cost of full clearance. 
59 In addition, on another ECOSORN worksite, a large unexploded munition was discovered embedded in a dam. UXO 
is less likely to explode but the risk is far from negligible, particularly when heavy equipment is being used. 
60 The World Bank has developed mine action guidelines for Bank-financed road reconstruction projects. These specify 
up to 35 meters on both sides of the centerline, and demining of related work sites, borrow pits, etc.  
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of this scale of the contract – two international NGOs (HALO Trust and MAG) and the national 
operator, CMAC. In addition, some demining firms expressed interest,61 but it is unlikely a firm 
could match CMAC’s price-output proposal, for reasons outlined below. 
 
The NGOs and CMAC receive the bulk of their funding as grants. There is opportunity for them 
to ‘cross-subsidise’ by using capital equipment, facilities, and management time that has already 
been financed by other donors. In the specific case of Cambodia, CMAC receives very large 
donations of equipment from Japan, some of which is not used to full capacity. Because of this, at 
least, the international demining NGOs have never bid on tenders against CMAC.62  
 
These matters are well known in Cambodia. For example, in 2006 another tendering system for 
demining services was established – the Clearing for Results pooled-funding project managed by 
UNDP. Plans to introduce competitive tendering have been put on hold pending a mid-term 
evaluation because: 
 
• no system is in place to accurately define demining tasks, leaving significant discretion in 
the hands of the operator, requiring much tighter quality assurance and control (QA/QC); 
• the time and cost of strengthening the QA/QC system would be significant, and 
• given the market structure in Cambodia, it was unlikely a knowledgeable operator would 
bid against CMAC63 
 
Thus, ECOSORN initiated a process that provided strong incentives to demining operators to 
cross-subsidise an EC-financed project and, in the opinion of the Evaluation Team, virtually 
ensured that CMAC would be the successful bidder. As it turned out, only CMAC submitted a 
bid, which was extremely attractive, with a target of 200 ha. clearance and 200 ha. ‘area 
reduction’. A back-of-the-envelope calculation is that CMAC will spend the following to fulfil its 
ECOSORN contract: 
 
Full clearance: 200 ha. @ $10,000 per ha. = $2 million64 
Area reduction: 200 ha. @ $5,000 per ha. = $1 million 
 
CMAC will receive €1,172,848 = approximately $1.75 million from ECOSORN. But this 
includes the costs of ‘institutional strengthening’. If we assume a maximum of $1.5 million for 
demining, other donors to CMAC will be subsidising ECOSORN by perhaps $1.5 million.  
 
There is nothing untoward about incremental costing by NGOs and public entities. Most such 
programmes never capture full scale economies because they are too small and – in the case of 
demining certainly – tied-aid contributions mean they may have under-utilised equipment. In the 
case of CMAC, its other donors are supporting Cambodia’s development and/or its treaty 
obligations and, in the end, ECOSORN is making a contribution toward those objectives. 
However, the competitive tender was a cumbersome process that was unlikely to (and did not) 
elicit any real competition and – in the opinion of the evaluation team – created incentives that 
                                                     
61 Conceivably, the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF) could also have submitted a proposal. However, a 
proposal by RCAF would contravene standard international competitive bidding rules as applied by the World Bank, 
ADB and others unless it established an arm’s length subsidiary, with clear safeguards against cross-subsidisation. As 
well, there have been many questions raised over the years regarding the quality of RCAF demining operations. 
62 HALO Trust and MAG do not receive equipment donations that are unrelated to specific grant agreements. Thus, 
they do not have significant amounts of surplus equipment available to cross-subsidise a new contract.  
63 Discussions with Steve Munroe and Dylan Gelard, UNDP, 26 August 2008.  
64 This implies a cost of $1/m2 – higher than what CMAC claims its costs are but at the low end of cost-estimates by 
outside observers. See, for example, Gildestad or Griffen & Keeley. 
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would reduce rather than enhance transparency.65 Better outcomes could have been achieved in a 
more transparent manner by simply granting the money to CMAC (or to one of the other 
operators) with the proviso that demining tasks specified by ECOSORN would receive priority.  
 
There are other reasons why the competitive tender was inappropriate, even if there was a viable 
competitor to CMAC. It creates commercial ‘rules of the game’ that give incentives to achieve 
output targets rather than intended outcomes. It also creates incentives to minimise costs per area 
demined, which could compromise safety to both deminers and end-users. Thus, commercial 
demining contacts require more rigorous quality assurance (QA) to ensure these incentives do not 
dominate. There is no national capacity to perform QA on behalf of ECOSORN.  
 
In summary, the design of the mine action sub-component was ill-conceived and the early 
outcome were unacceptable and unnecessary exposure to risks for ECOSORN and sub-contractor 
personnel and equipment.66  
 
Community-Based Victim Assistance Projects 
 
The CSP 2004-06 noted that Cambodia was eligible for funding from a number of EC horizontal 
budget lines, including that for anti-personnel landmines. In 2007, the EC Delegation to 
Cambodia issued a call for proposals for ‘Community Participation to the Actions Related to 
Antipersonnel Mines’. Subsequently, two grant agreements of € 500,000 each were awarded to: 
 
1. Instituto de Estudios Políticos para América Latina y África (IEPALA), partnered with 
Cambodian War Amputees Rehabilitation Society (CWARS) 
2. Handicap International, France (HI-F) 
  
IEPALA and CWARS 
CWARS is a Canadian-Cambodian NGO providing rehabilitative services to war amputees.67 It 
has been active in Cambodia for over 15 years, providing mainly vocational training to disabled 
people, many of whom are landmine victims. CWARS is one of the largest Cambodian NGOs 
and the largest provider of vocational training to disabled people. It operates four large residential 
training facilities each with a capacity of 300 or more trainees. This capacity would allow a 
significant programme expansion if sufficient funding could be obtained for operational costs. 
  
CWARS receives funding from a number of official donor agencies and a large private 
foundation. Compared to its experience with other donors, CWARS found the EC tendering 
process to be frustrating. The initial IEPALA/CWARS proposal was rejected by the Bangkok 
Delegation, reportedly over concerns regarding sustainability. It dealt with the Phnom Penh sub-
Delegation on the second submission and found the process to be smoother. 
 
The proposal itself is to train 900 amputees (300 per year for 3 years) in vocational skills and 
functional literacy. Trainees will receive trade tools and there will be post-training assistance in 
small business management. As the target EC areas are Oddar Meancheay and Pailin, disabled 
people from there will be brought to the existing centre in Banteay Meanchey. CWARS will 
establish systems in Oddar Meancheay and Pailin to monitor the success of the trainees. 
                                                     
65 Enhanced transparency typically is one of the principal rationales for the introduction of competitive bidding. 
66 In follow-up meetings in April, the Evaluation Team was advised by the CMAC manager assigned to ECOSORN 
that he was satisfied with the measures put-in-place after our February mission. There is every reason to expect CMAC 
support to ECOSORN, and to the communities in the areas covered by ECOSORN, will be effective. 
67 CWARS has a established partnership with Oxfam Québec. The link with IEPALA was created when an Oxfam 
Québec staff member joined the Spanish foundation. 
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Handicap International–France 
HI-F has been active in Cambodia for many years. Since 2002, it has focused on disability 
programming, including management of two rehabilitation centres, health programmes, and a 
variety of social and economic initiatives. HI-F has significant experience with EC-funded 
projects and experienced few difficulties with the recent call for proposals.  
 
The specific initiative proposed for the EC grant is called The Way to Socio-Economic 
Integration, which represents an extension of earlier initiatives covering social support and 
economic integration. Economic integration represents a relatively new innovation for HI-F in 
Cambodia. This entails a shift from traditional charity to a rights-based approach, with increased 
emphasis on beneficiaries’ own solutions and exit points for HI-F and its local partner (Operation 
Enfant Cambodge – OEC – which has experience in working with child mine victims). 
 
The genesis of the current project was a 2005 pilot to assist vulnerable people (many of which 
were disabled) to attain sustainable livelihoods. Following the pilot, HI-F held a workshop that 
led to a proposal for a full project, with two distinct components: livelihoods and social support 
(emphasis on social support is required in poorer districts, where fewer livelihoods opportunities 
exist). AusAID provided funding in 2007, allowing HI-F to further develop its methodology.  
 
AusAID-funding finishes at the end of March 2008, at which point the EC-funded project will 
begin. The project will cover four districts in Battambang selected on two criteria: impact of 
landmines (ranked by casualties) and economic potential to develop livelihoods. Some 560 
beneficiaries (70% mine victims) will receive support. In addition, HI-F will provide capacity 
development support for the 52 staff of its local partner so OEC can make the shift to an 
‘independent living’ programming approach and assume responsibility for the project. 




EC-financed mine action initiatives in Cambodia have been relevant to Cambodia’s needs and 
development strategies, EU Strategies for Mine Action, and the CSPs for 2002-04 and 2004-06.68  
 
Given the evolution of the Thai-Cambodia border dispute, 69 EC assistance to a joint demining 
programme for the border would be highly relevant both to the needs of these two countries and 
to the EC Regional Programming Strategy & Multi-Annual Indicative Programme for Asia.  
 
While EC support for mine action has been relevant, it has provided relatively little assistance to 
mine action in Cambodia in comparison to other seriously mine-affected countries.70 In this 
regard, the following observations warrant discussion: 
 
                                                     
68 Note in particular, the latter document states, However, experience has shown that constraints to access to land due 
to UXO and landmine contamination is better addressed from a rural development perspective, rather than a purely 
humanitarian response as they can be major obstacles to the implementation of rural development programmes. 
69 See, for example, ‘Cambodia, Thailand agree to withdraw troops from border temple’, Associated Press, 28 July 
2008, reporting that the Foreign Ministers of Cambodia and Thailand agreed on “the setting up of a joint border 
commission to solve any differences, and the demining of the disputed area, its vicinity and that adjacent to Preah 
Vihear temple”. <<http://www.breitbart.com/article.php?id=D926V2A02&show_article=1>> accessed 5 Aug 08 
70 Probably the only other countries in the world with comparable landmine contamination problems are Afghanistan, 
Iraq and Iran. Laos and Vietnam have comparable ERW contamination, but neither is a signatory to the APMBC.  
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• the EU has a global policy to support mine action, particularly in countries that are States 
Parties to the Ottawa Convention,  
• the EC provides only an insignificant amount of mine action funding to one of the 
world’s most mine-impacted countries (which is a State Party) 
• the EC does not envisage any further mine action funding to that country from its 
geographic envelope for at least the period 2007-2010.  
  
One possible answer is that, in light of the Paris Declaration and the EU Code of Conduct, the 
EC delegation has determined that it should selectively focus its efforts on a few sectors. 
Selectivity is warranted, particularly where the EC assistance envelope is rather modest. It would 
have even stronger merit where either or both of the following conditions prevailed: 
 
• mine action did not feature strongly in the country’s PRSP and other development policy 
documents 
• as provided in the EU Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labour, one 
of the EU member states was taking the lead on mine action to (i) develop common EU 
positions on mine action, (ii) enhance the effectiveness of the TWG for mine action as a 
forum for policy dialogue, and (iii) make possible joint programming 
 
However, neither of these conditions prevailed in Cambodia when the relevant programming 
decisions were made.71 
 
A second possibility is that, irrespective of the RGC policy pronouncements on mine action, its 
actual commitment to the sector was negligible, so there was no possibility for effective 
programming. In 2003-04, members of the EC sub-delegation did have significant concerns about 
the Government’s willingness to address weaknesses in the CMAA. However, many development 
sectors in Cambodia are hampered by weak state organs, and the donor response ranges from (i) 
reinforcing capacity development efforts, (ii) utilising alternative service delivery mechanisms 
(e.g. NGOs), and (iii) abandoning the sector.  
 
In the case of Cambodia, there are very capable mine action NGOs, and ECHO evaluators had 
adjudged that ECHO support channelled through these NGOs had been effective. So the EC could 
have provided additional support directly to HALO Trust, MAG, or HI-B (which partnered with 
CMAC for the ECHO grant). This would have allowed the EC to contribute to the delivery of 
essential public services and been in line with EU policies on Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and 
Development (LRRD). Indeed, in 2003 the Vice President of CMAA had written to the EC 
proposing € 4.5 million of the € 5 million programmed for mine action should go directly to 
demining operators rather than to the CMAA.  
 
However, the EC decided instead to bundle the mine action funds into the ECOSORN IRD 
project. Was that decision appropriate? 
 
Appropriateness72 
If there had been any doubts before, the mine/ERW incidents experienced on ECOSORN work 
sites in the first few months of 2008 (as well as similar incidents on other infrastructure projects 
in Cambodia) make it clear that the strategy of incorporating mine action within an IRD project is 
appropriate when such projects are working in mine contaminated areas of a country. Indeed, it is 
                                                     
71 It is possible that Germany might cover the Technical Working Group for mine action in the future. 
72 When used as an evaluation criterion, ‘appropriateness’ refers to inputs (e.g. it is appropriate to include a mine action 
component in an IRD project) whereas ‘relevance’ relates to the envisaged results (outputs, outcomes, and impacts). 
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clear that ECOSORN and any other such project operating in north-western Cambodia will 
depend to some degree on support from the mine action programme.73 However, the general 
strategy of incorporating mine action in an IRD project was not backed-up by work by the EC to 
(i) make the necessary modifications to the overall design of the IRD project, (ii) provide for 
specialised mine action expertise, (iii) monitor the evolution of Cambodia’s mine action 
programme, or (iv) consult with other donors to draw-upon their knowledge of the mine action 
programme and to benefit from lessons learnt.74 
 
ECOSORN had an extremely long gestation period – over five years from the initial identification 
mission to the project start-up. This period saw rapid evolution for the mine action sector and for 
Cambodia more generally. However, the EC Delegation in Bangkok and the sub-Delegation in 
Phnom Penh did not have the capacity to monitor the evolution of the mine action programme, 
draw conclusions and (potentially) suggest adjustments to the ECOSORN project design.  
 
Thus, while the strategy of incorporating dedicated mine action support into ECOSORN was 
appropriate, the means for effective execution of the strategy were lacking. An inadequate project 
design, coupled with inflexible EC rules (e.g. the D+3 rule), led to problems in implementation. 
 
Efficiency 
The scale of EC assistance to mine action has been far too small to garner efficiencies of scale, a 
problem compounded by the tendency to support multiple initiatives (e.g. three distinct ECHO 
projects in 2002; two victim assistance projects in 2007). This would be less a concern if EC 
support had been well coordinated with other initiatives, either through RGC efforts (e.g. the 
formulation of a clear and feasible strategy for the national mine action programme) or via a 
donor coordination mechanism. Unfortunately, there was no adequate government strategy in 
place, and donor coordination has been fitful, with limited participation from the EC. 
 
The mine action component in ECOSORN promises to be extremely cost-effective75 from the 
perspective of the EC. However, this is in large part due to hidden cross-subsidisation of EC-
supported activities by other donors.  
 
It is far too early to assess the efficiency of the two new victim assistance projects. However, the 
fact that EC support is (i) utilising spare capacity in CWARS vocational training centres and (ii) 
building on a pilot HI-F project funded by AusAID compensates, to a degree, for the fact that 
these projects are far too small to garner economies of scale. 
 
Effectiveness 
Past EC support to operators appears to have been effective, but support to capacity development 
of national organs has been less so.76 
 
In spite of problems along the way, the mine action component of ECOSORN promises to be 
effective in terms of the results envisaged for the SAL component. This is due in large part to the 
competence of CMAC and supporting elements of the mine action programme (e.g. the MAPU).  
 
                                                     
73 Previous IRD projects in the North-West appear to have obtained contamination data from CMAC largely so they 
could avoid mine affected communities. Such a strategy is hardly consistent with the poverty focus of the CSPs. 
74 The officer in the sub-delegation responsible for rural development and mine action departed in 2004, and the 
position remained vacant for two years. 
75 Cost-effectiveness is one specific measure of efficiency. 
76 HI-B’s support to the LUPU was effective in the short-term, but LUPU operations were disrupted by the enactment 
of the new Land Law in 2001. Key LUPU capacities have been retained within the MAPU. 
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On broader measures of aid effectiveness, ECOSORN fares less well. It appears that demining 
assets will be deployed to some areas that are not significantly affected by contamination (see 
graph), when the same funds could have paid for clearance in heavily contaminated communes.77 
As well, the combination of a faulty project design for the mine action activities and inflexible EC 
procedures (such as the D+3 rule) led to the use of an inappropriate mechanism for awarding the 
contract for demining services. Simpler and more transparent alternates were available to achieve 
results commensurate with the actual EC financial contribution, without hidden cross-
subsidisation from other mine action donors.  
 




























































































































The long build-up to the tender for mine action services also seems to have exacerbated 
coordination problems between the MAFF and the mine action programme. This is a matter of 
real concern as it is clear that (i) mine action needs to align more closely with rural development 
initiatives and (ii) rural development projects in mine/ERW-contaminated parts of Cambodia 
require mine action support, particularly for infrastructure reconstruction activities. It is possible 
that good performance by CMAC could mitigate these problems to some degree. 
 
It is far too early to assess the effectiveness of the two new victim assistance projects. However, 
both projects are being implemented by organisations with long experience in disability 
programming in Cambodia, and both seek sustainable solutions for their target beneficiaries. 
There is every reason to hope that both projects will deliver good outcomes. 
 
Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD) 
There was no RELEX or AIDCO follow-up to capitalise on ECHO mine action assistance in 
Cambodia, in spite of an evaluation that concluded the ECHO-funded projects “carried out 
                                                     
77 Just fifteen communes account for 50% of all landmine casualties in Cambodia. We do not have a list of all 
communes and target villages covered by ECOSORN, so cannot do analysis below the district level. 
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significant interventions that will greatly benefit the villagers …Additional support will ensure 
that these initiatives attain their full potential and that the mine/UXO casualty and risk reduction 
models and methodologies developed by these three projects will have a significant impact on 




The following lessons learned stem from the ECOSORN project.  
 
1. Some EC regulations, such as the requirement to issue all contracts for goods, services, and 
works be signed within three years of the budgetary commitment by the Commission (the 
D+3 rule), mean EC delegates and the organisations implementing projects (or providing 
technical assistance to implementing agencies) do not have the flexibility required for 
effective management of complex projects, which inevitably require the adjustment of plans 
based on conditions on the ground. This problem is even more crippling when – as in the case 
of ECOSORN – (i) the initial project design is inadequate and (ii) projects have long 
gestation periods before the start of implementation. 
  
2. When a project entails working in an area that may be contaminated by explosives: 
• Initial design surveys should investigate the possibility of explosives contamination in or 
around work sites 
• Arrangements for mine action support should be made, whether by incorporating a mine 
action component into the project or by a side agreement/directed contract with the 
national mine action authority and/or with mine action operators in the vicinity 
 
3. For projects entailing civil engineering works (especially infrastructure reconstruction), land 
preparation for agriculture, etc. in areas that may suffer from explosives contamination, the 
following additional steps should be taken: 
• Initial design surveys, social and environmental impacts surveys, etc. should: 
o investigate the possibility of explosives contamination in or around work 
sites  
o investigate the potential future dangers from people migrating to 
contaminated areas because infrastructure has been built or reconstructed, 
land has been improved for agriculture, etc., and 
o incorporate appropriate risk mitigation measures in the project design based 
on the findings of these investigations  
• Mine action experts should be involved in the preparation of all statements of work 
and contracts/grant agreements for mine action activities; 
• Mine action risk mitigation measures should be in place before work on civil 
engineering or land preparation components begins. Such measures should include 
MRE for all project and sub-contractor personnel, and may include additional survey 
of some or all of the planned civil engineering/land preparation sites;78 
• All tenders for civil engineering works should make explicit reference to the 
possibility of explosives contamination and that all sub-contractor personnel assigned 
to the project shall be required to complete an MRE course (specifically designed to 
address workplace safety in areas of suspected contamination) prior to deployment in 
areas where contamination is suspected. Contracts should include a clear statement 
                                                     
78 This would depend on whether the national mine action authority has sufficient data to certify whether the specific 
work areas proposed are free of contamination. Even where records exist that contamination has been cleared, the 
clearance depth is normally in the range of 30 cm, so additional surveys would be required for infrastructure work sites. 
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that failure to abide with workplace safety provisions in potentially contaminated 
areas by a sub-contractor or its personnel could be considered a breach of contract; 
• As the effectiveness of current methods for locating deeply buried landmines have 
not been thoroughly tested, there is a residual risk to equipment and personnel when 
undertaking road reconstruction projects79 in contaminated regions. Supplemental risk 
reduction measures (e.g. armour-protected equipment; fully-enclosed operator cabs; 
minimum safety distances for observers; standby demining support) should be 
required for specific sections of a road where the risk of contamination is high. 
 
4. For both workplace safety and liability reasons, in some cases the EC may wish to require 
contactors and sub-contractors to provide insurance to their workers that covers legacy of war 
issues such as explosives contamination.  
 
5. Contracts or other agreements with organisations responsible for demining support services to 
development activities should include clear statements that the overarching responsibility of 
the demining operator is the mitigation of explosives contamination risks for workers and the 
intended beneficiaries and that, where there is reasonable concern that workers or 
beneficiaries could be killed or injured, prior administrative approval is not required for any 




5. The EC sub-Delegation should meet with managers from ECOSORN, CMAC, and the Socio-
Economic section of CMAA to discuss lessons learned from the experience to date with 
ECOSORN, and possible steps to enhance the coordination between mine action and rural 
development (including MAFF). 
 
6. The EC should let it be known to the Foreign Ministers of Thailand and Cambodia that it is 
willing to support the implementation of an agreement to permanently resolve the current 
dispute centring on the Preah Vihear temple. Such support could include financial assistance 
for a joint effort to demine the disputed area, its vicinity and that adjacent to Preah Vihear 
temple, as was agreed at the 28 July 2008 meeting of the Foreign Ministers in Siem Reap. 
 
7. The EC should meet with representatives from EU member states to agree who should take 
the lead in the mine action sector, in line with the EU Code of Conduct on Complementarity 
and Division of Labour. 
 
8. EC headquarters should develop and issue clear principles and guidelines for its personnel 




                                                     
79 When building a new road, it normally will be less expensive to avoid suspected hazards. When reconstructing a road 
however, it normally is less expensive to reinforce and build on the existing foundation. This could expose landmines 
that were too deeply to be detected in standard demining operations. 
80 The Cambodia Mission Report contained another recommendation concerning the classification of the ECOSORN 
project in Cambodia’s aid database which is not relevant for the regional report. 
81 EC headquarters recently issued Guidelines on European Community Mine Action, which is a sound document but 
needs to be supplemented by more detailed guidance on technical mine action issues. 
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LAO PDR82 
CONTEXT 
The Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR) has perhaps the world’s worst explosives 
contamination problem. Most of this is unexploded ordnance (UXO) stemming from the Vietnam 
War. Starting in 1964, the US began saturation bombing of the Ho Chi Minh Trail, used by North 
Vietnam to supply its forces and the Viet Kong in the South. This prolonged bombing was the 
most intense in history, averaging the equivalent of one mission every eight minutes for nine 
years. Over two million tons of ordnance was dropped on Lao PDR  – equal to the combined total 
dropped by all combatants during the Second World War.83 An estimated 10%-30% of this 
ordnance, including millions of ‘bombies’ from cluster bombs, did not explode. In addition, the 
North Vietnamese established munitions depots along the Ho Chi Minh Trail, some of which 
were partially detonated by air strikes, scattering more UXO.84 
 
It was not until June 1996 – 21 years after hostilities 
ended – that Handicap International (HI) undertook a 
broad survey of the impact of UXO contamination on 
behalf of UXO LAO, the government agency 
established to coordinate mine and UXO programmes. 
In brief:  
• Over 2,800 villages, or 25% of all communities 
in 15 of the 16 provinces85 reported the 
continued presence of UXO, while 214 villages 
reported landmines; 
• Almost 12,000 UXO-related accidents were 
reported, with accident rates peaking at about 
1,400 per year in 1974 as people returned to 
their homes and fields. Casualty rates fell to an 
average of 360/year from 1977-1986, then 
240/year the following decade; 
• 31% of all victims were children (mostly boys); 
• Almost 2/3 of accidents occurred within the village or in nearby rice fields; 
• A significant percentage of accidents arose when men purposely handled UXO to extract 
scrap metal or explosives; 
• Accidents peak at the end of the dry season (March-May) when farmers plough lowland 
rice fields or, in upland areas, clear new fields by slash-and-burn. 
 
The overall picture is a familiar one, with a high rate of casualties during the initial return to 
villages abandoned during the conflict, followed by a slow decline in accidents as those in 
affected communities adapt to the contamination. Risk-taking behaviour, as extremely poor 
people attempt to capitalise on the UXO ‘resource’, also resulted in many accidents. Many 
                                                     
82 See Lao PDR Country Mission Report. 
83 This represents only the tally from ‘official’ air strikes. Recently released data suggests that the carnage from 
clandestine flights may have been even more extensive. 
84 The U.S. also used massive quantities of Agent Orange. Studies have confirmed that Agent Orange resulted in 
significant dioxin contamination in nearby western Vietnam (Hatfield Consultants, 2000), where there have been 
unusually high rates of birth defects and ‘wasting’ diseases. Studies are trying to confirm these are the result of dioxin. 
Researchers also found high levels of dioxin in the food chain; particularly from aquaculture.   
85 The capital, Vientiane, has a distinct administration and, until recently, there also was a ‘special administrative zone.’ 
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villages were reported to have relocated due to mine contamination. 
 
More than 100 UXO accidents are still reported to authorities each year, implying a continuing 
rate of perhaps 200 accidents a year because reports cannot be obtained from many remote 
communities. Tampering has become an even larger problem due to the availability of 
inexpensive metal detectors and the establishment of foundries and mini-mills in Laos. 
 
Many rural development projects also have been adversely affected by UXO contamination, 
including those supported by INGOs. In addition, many of the larger aid-financed infrastructure 
projects (road and bridge construction, dams for hydro-electricity), as well as private investments 
in mining, have been affected by UXO contamination. In some cases, explicit provision for 
UXO/mine clearance had been made during the planning phase of the project, while in others 
UXO was discovered only during the construction phase.  
HISTORY OF THE UXO SECTOR 
In 1994, Mines Advisory Group (MAG) established a UXO project in Xieng Khouang at the 
behest of the Mennonite Central Committee. Subsequent discussions among the government, 
UNDP, UNICEF, and MAG led to the establishment of the Lao PDR UXO Trust Fund in late 
1995, followed by a decree establishing UXO LAO as the equivalent of both a national Mine 
Action Centre (MAC) and a national operator. Shortly thereafter, UNICEF, along with MAG and 
UXO LAO, developed a strategy to establish a national UXO awareness programme 
 
Victim assistance also expanded, with involvement of HI and other NGOs providing prosthetics, 
physiotherapy, community-based rehabilitation, and financial assistance to UXO victims. In 
1998, a number of NGOs and government agencies joined to form Co-operative Orthotic and 
Prosthetic Enterprise (COPE). It supports the National Rehabilitation Centre with technical 
assistance, equipment and training. 
 
UXO LAO pursued a strategy of enlisting implementation partners to establish provincial 
operations. This allowed for rapid expansion, and gave interested donors the option of providing 
direct funding to an international NGO. The first of the implementing partners engaged local staff 
directly and were responsible for operations management in three provinces. Since mid-1997, 
new implementing partners were taken-on as advisors, responsible in the main for capacity 
building. In such cases, Lao personnel were hired and trained by UXO LAO and then assigned to 
provincial operations. By April 2000, UXO LAO changed strategy and assumed responsibility for 
managing all operations, with partners in capacity building roles.  
 
Following the change in strategy, funding to the UXO programme declined significantly in 2002, 
forcing UXO LAO to cut its work force almost in half. This led UNDP and UXO LAO to 
commission an assessment of the UXO Sector.86 Among the recommendations were to: 
 
• separate the planning, coordination and regulatory functions of UXO LAO from 
implementation (and consider allowing other operators to re-establish) 
• develop a 10-year strategic plan 
• focus the UXO programme more clearly on broader development priorities 
 
In response to the UXO sector assessment, in April 2004 the government approved a new 10 year 
UXO sector strategy – the Safe Path Forward. This recommended the establishment of a new 
                                                     
86 Keeley et al (2002), Mission to Assess Future Sustainable Options of the Lao UXO Trust Fund and the UXO LAO 
Mine Action Programme: Mission Report. 
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National Regulatory Authority (NRA), which the government created later in 2004. However, it 
took another two years before the legal framework was in place and the office established. 
 
The UXO sector is now headed by a national mine action authority – the NRA Board87 – whose 
secretariat (the NRA Office) discharges a number of responsibilities typically found in a national 
Mine Action Centre (MAC). Since the NRA office was established in 2006, it has been active in 
the Oslo Process and in promoting government acceptance of the proposed Convention on Cluster 
Munitions (CCM). It also has made some progress on: 
 
• enhancing coordination of UXO programme operations  
• developing draft standards for UXO clearance operations  
• updating the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) 
 
As yet, however, it has made little progress in raising its own profile within the government, or in 
getting the government to increase its own contributions to the UXO sector. 
 
The Safe Path Forward sets-out the following objectives for the UXO programme: 
 
1. Accidents will be reduced to a national rate not exceeding 100 persons/year 
2. clearance of all “high priority” agricultural areas by 2013, as well as a sizeable portion of 
other areas identified as “medium priority” 
3. the development and maintenance of a national database on Mine/UXO accidents  
4. factoring-in the specific needs of UXO/mine survivors into all public health initiatives. 
 
The strategy also lays out guidelines for establishing clearance priorities: 
Table 4 – UXO/Mine Clearance Priorities
88
 
Priority Types of Tasks 
Priority I 
(High) 
1. Agricultural tasks 
2. Roving tasks 
3. Public service utilities (medical/public health, water points, etc.) 
4. Educational facilities 
Priority II 
(Medium) 
1. Grazing land and forested areas 
2. Communal facilities(religious/cultural sites, markets, recreational areas, etc.) 
3. Government facilities and offices 
Priority III 
(Low) 
1. Public infrastructure work 
2. Communal “profit-making” areas 
3. Tourism sites 
4. Commercial/private business sites 
 
There are now a national operator (UXO LAO), three international NGOs, and three commercial 
demining operators. 
Table 5 – Clearance operators & provinces or clients covered in 2007 
Organisation Expend. (2007) Province(s)/Contract 
UXO LAO $6.0 million Luang Prabang, Houaphan, Xieng Khouang, 
Khammouane, Savannakhet, Saravane, Sekong, 
Champassak, Attapeu 
                                                     
87 The Board is an inter-ministerial body comprising representatives of nine ministries concerned with UXO activities 
under the leadership of a Deputy Prime Minister (who is also Minister of Defence). 
88 Clearly, there are problems with these guidelines. Why, for example, should all public infrastructure work be low 
priority? Why should all agricultural tasks be high priority when it varies in potential? 
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Organisation Expend. (2007) Province(s)/Contract 
MAG 4.6 million
89
 Xieng Khouang, Khammouane 
FSD 1.0 million Savannakhet, Sekong  
HI-B 0.5 million Savannakhet  
Phoenix (PCL) 0.6 million various  
Milsearch 
BACTEC 
4.0 million Oxiana 
 
Collectively, they cleared 4,190 ha (4.2 km2) in 2007, about 53% of which was for agriculture, 
with the rest classified broadly as ‘other development’. UXO LAO accounted for about 61% of 
the total area cleared.90 In addition to area clearance, roving teams of the demining operators 
conducted almost 1,700 village visits, destroying 37,000 items of UXO in the process. 
 
UXO LAO, MAG, and HI-B also conduct UXO risk education activities, while MAG provides an 
MRE technical advisor to the NRA as part of a project to update MRE policy and standards. 
COPE – a partnership between the National Rehabilitation Centre (Ministry of Health) and four 
international NGOs – supports the national rehabilitation service. The service operates through 
five rehabilitation centres with about 40% of its clients being victims of UXO. 
UXO IN NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES 
The government issued its sixth National Socio-Economic Development Plan: 2006-10 (NSEDP) 
in October 2006.91 This has a strong focus on poverty reduction. Given most of the population 
(and an even higher proportion of poor households) live in rural areas, rural development is key 
for poverty reduction. The 6th NSEDP highlights 47 very poor and 25 poor districts for targeted 
interventions. It also outlines three national poverty-focussed programmes, one of which focuses 
on UXO. 
 
As in most countries, explosive contamination in Laos affects rural areas disproportionately. 
Rural development policy centres on improved service delivery in the 47 very poor districts. 
Public service delivery to highly dispersed populations is unaffordable, so a process of village 
consolidation is under way to move all villages into clusters (khets) of viable size, coupled with 
targeted development of ‘focal areas’. This leads to the controversial policy of relocating 
minorities from upland areas to khets in the lowlands. However, the relocated people are then 
exposed to lowland diseases to which they have no resistance, and must adapt to dramatically 
different livelihoods. Donors and human rights organisations are also concerned that political 
motivations may underlie the relocation policy.  
 
Initially, the UXO programme was very much donor-driven, and UXO was not seen as a 
government priority. For example, the 1999-2000 Socio-Economic Plan had but one sentence on 
UXO in 34 pages of text. This has changed progressively and dramatically, and the 6th NSEDP 
highlights the UXO programme as one of three ‘poverty-focussed national programmes’ (see, in 
particular, pp. 102-04). The negative impact of UXO is highlighted in other sections on poverty, 
human security, gender, natural resources and the environment, food security, and education (p. 
150). The 6th NSEDP sets a clear and ambitious target – to clear UXO from all high priority 
agricultural areas by 2013. 
                                                     
89 About 25% of MAG expenditures are for technical advisors assigned to the NRA or UXO Lao. 
90 As in most countries, there are significant differences in the nature of tasks undertaken under commercial contracts. 
Firms averaged just over 4 items of UXO/ha., while not-for-profit operators found almost four times as many. Among 
the latter group, the international NGOs located approximately three times as many UXO per ha. as did UXO LAO. 
91 The Government has also developed a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) through a relatively participatory 
process. The current version is called the National Growth and Poverty Eradication Strategy (NGPES). 
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EC SUPPORT FOR MINE ACTION 
In 2005-06, the EC was the 10th largest donor to Lao PDR, with gross disbursements averaging 
only $10 million/year. The amounts available for new programming via the NIP/MIP have been 
extremely modest. From the late 1990s until 2002, the bulk of EC support to Laos focussed on 
rural development and health. It also supported UXO clearance (HI-B in Savannakhet and MAG 
in Khammouane).  
CSP 2002-06 and NIP 2002-04 
The CSP for 2002-06 identified three ‘focal areas’ for EC assistance: rural development; social 
sector (education and health); and trade and development. It did note the problem of UXO 
contamination, particularly in relation to the development problems faced in upland areas. It also 
mentioned that Lao authorities emphasised their desire for the EC to make a direct contribution to 
UXO Lao. Regardless, the CSP/NIP did not provide for any funding for UXO. However, a total 
of € 2 million from the thematic APL budget line was made available for Laos in 2003 and 2004.  
CSP 2007-13 and MIP 2007-10 
The main focus (58% of the budgeted allocation) of the country strategy for 2007-2013 is to be 
delivered via a multi-donor poverty reduction programme led by the World Bank. The CSP also 
identified actions in three non-focal sectors: (i) food security, highlighting sustainable 
development in the uplands and policy dialogue on relocation (24% of the budgeted allocation); 
governance and human rights (5%); and trade and economic cooperation (13%). In addition, the 
CSP highlighted possible actions in Laos via various thematic programmes: food security; non-
state actors (NGO co-financing); and democracy and human rights. 
 
The CSP did highlight the problem of UXO contamination in a number of places including the 
fact that UXO contamination complicates rural development (p. 12) and that Lao PDR is, on a per 
capita basis, the most bombed country on the planet. (p. 27) A separate section on mine action 
concluded that “Continued funding of UXO clearance in Lao PDR should therefore be favourably 
considered under Thematic Programmes.” (p. 28) The option of funding via the UXO-Lao Trust 
Fund rather than calls for proposals was held out, but only if Lao PDR signed the APMBC. 
 
The EC Mine Action Strategy and Multi-Annual Indicative Programme: 2005-2007 shows € 1.5 
million from the thematic budget line for 2006-07. However, this million never materialised,92 to 
the surprise of the sub-delegation and HI, which had been anticipating some of this money for its 
project in Savannakhet. The start-up costs for this project had been financed by the EC in 2004 
and the expensive equipment, as well as the personnel, would have been idle if it did not receive 
continued funding. HI had not arranged an alternative source of funding, and the EC sub-
delegation did not have funds available within the country programme budget.  
 
Eventually, AusAID stepped-in with A$500,000, allowing HI to continue its UXO project for 
nine months. Before the end of the AusAID project, HI was able to obtain € 500,000 via the call 
for proposals issued by the EC for the Non-State Actors & Local Authorities thematic programme 
(UXO contamination had been highlighted as a target issue in the call for proposals). MAG also 
obtained € 500,000 from the same competition for a project in Khammoune. Another grant of € 
100,000 was awarded in 2007 to the NRA for a national survey of UXO victims via an open call 
for proposals for the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights.  
                                                     
92 The thematic budget line had been eliminated as part of the broader reform of EC aid programmes. However, the 
unspent funds from the budget line were transferred to the relevant country programmes. It remains unclear why the 
funds programmed for Laos were not transferred – perhaps the concern that Laos had not signed the APMBC? 
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ECHO 
ECHO does not support mine action per se, but will provide funding for demining, MRE, or 
victim assistance where this allows other humanitarian activities to proceed. Prior to 2005 in 
Laos, ECHO provided significant assistance focussed on ethnic minorities and their resettlement, 
primarily in the north of the country. In some projects, provision was made for UXO clearance 
and awareness activities. In 2004, however, a grant was issued to MAG for emergency UXO 
clearance to support three other ECHO-financed projects in Khammoune. 
  
From 2005, ECHO phased-out of emergency projects in Laos, restricting itself to disaster 
preparedness (DIPECHO). The task of supporting upland minorities/relocation was handed-over 
to the EC thematic programme for food security.   
 
The overall picture we have been able to piece together shows about € 8.5 million in EC funding 
for UXO since 1998, with somewhat of a declining trend.93 
 























Current EC-funded UXO Projects 
Three EC-funded projects are now underway, all funded via thematic programmes rather than the 
geographic envelope for Laos. 
 
National UXO Victims Survey – NRA & COPE 
In February 2007, the NRA and COPE submitted an application for the open call for proposals 
for the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights for € 100,000 to undertake a 
national UXO victims survey. They received notice in May 2007 that their application had been 
accepted, pending submission of some supporting documents (which the NRA and COPE say 
been included with the original application). A problem then arose as the NRA financial audit 
was ‘qualified’.95 Hence, the grant agreement was not signed until November 2007, with the 
                                                     
93 This graph does not show commitments, but estimated expenditures per year. 
94 The full list of EC-funded UXO projects in Laos is given in Appendix 4. 
95 Most but not all the funding to NRA comes from the UNDP Trust Fund, which commissions an annual audit. The 
auditors mandate only covers the transactions and the resulting financial statements covered by the Trust Fund, and so 
do not reflect the totality of NRA operations. It is normal practice for auditors to qualify the audit on these grounds, but 
such a qualification, in itself, does not imply weakness in the financial system or management control. Regardless, this 
caused problems for the EC Delegation in Bangkok which took months to resolve. 
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initial tranche of funding arriving the following month. Meanwhile, the project had started with a 
grant of $50,000 from UNICEF.96 
 
After some start-up difficulties, the full survey got underway in February 2008. The initial results 
were just being tabulated at the time of our mission. Following the survey, the NRA and COPE 
plan to support a national surveillance system using provincial government staff to collect data 
for NRA. From experience in other countries (e.g. Cambodia), this type of surveillance system 
could result in better targeting of clearance, UXO risk education, and survivor assistance services. 
 
The NRA/COPE say they have received informal feedback from the EC Delegation in Bangkok 
that it likes the project and would consider additional support in the future. 
 
Handicap International (HI) 
HI has been working in Laos in both the disability assistance and UXO sectors. Its UXO work 
began in 1996 with the national UXO survey, and it continued with technical and financial 
assistance to UXO Lao in Savannakhet from 1997. In 2001, it decided to scale-down its level of 
assistance to one technical advisor supporting UXO LAO in both Savannakhet and Khammoune; 
an activity funded by the EC that lasted until December 2004. 
 
In the meantime, UXO LAO had decided it should again allow international partners to establish 
separate operations, so HI decided to open a new programme in Savannakhet. In 2004, the EC 
issued a call for proposal for € 2 million in funding from the APL budget line. This call specified 
Savannakhet and the HI country office understood that the EC expected HI to win. In the end, its 
proposal was disqualified on a technicality97 and the call for proposals was reissued without 
specifying Savannakhet, and with two ‘lots’ – one for clearance plus MRE and the other for 
victim assistance.  
 
HI re-submitted the same core proposal (dropping the term ‘partner’ in the text, and eliminating 
the victim assistance component). In the end, the EC decided not to fund the victim assistance lot, 
transferred those funds to clearance/MRE, and awarded two projects for € 1 million each to HI 
and to MAG’s project in Khammoune. The grant agreement was signed in December 2004 and, 
following months of delays in obtaining the MOU from provincial authorities, HI started area and 
roving clearance plus UXO risk education operations in October 2005. 
 
Initially, HI did not have an exit strategy because it and the EC sub-delegation had been expecting 
an additional € 1.5 million in earmarked mine action money would be available for Laos in 2006-
07, as specified in the EU Mine Action Strategy. They were surprised to learn that these funds 
would not be forthcoming, but HI managed to secure an A$500,000 grant from AusAID to cover 
nine months of operations, during which time the EC issued the call for proposals for the Non-
State Actors & Local Authorities thematic programme. This specified UXO as one of the target 
sectors and HI was able to win a grant for € 500,000 to continue its UXO project. 
 
In March 2007, HI commissioned an evaluation of its EC-funded UXO project. The evaluator 
found the project to be relevant and effective, but too small to garner full economies of scale. 
Regardless, UXO clearance is not a central part of the overall HI mandate, so it follows what it 
terms an integrated risk strategy in Laos, with its clearance and risk education activities linked 
with a separately-funded community-based rehabilitation programme. 
                                                     
96 The total budget is $247,000, and the project also has received support from the UNDP Trust Fund for UXO 
($35,000) and the Swiss ($75,000).  
97 In the text of its proposal, HI had referred to an ‘associate’ organisation as a ‘partner’, and was disqualified. 
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Mines Advisory Group (MAG)  
MAG was the original UXO clearance operator in Laos, running programmes in Xieng Khouang 
and Saravane until 2001, at which point responsibility shifted to UXO LAO with MAG providing 
technical advisors. Following the 2002 UXO Sector evaluation, UXO LAO again allowed the 
international NGOs to establish operations, and in early 2004 MAG re-opened in Xieng Khouang 
and Khammoune with a principal focus on clearance for food security. 
 
The MAG programme in Laos is supported by many donors and it provides clearance support for 
the work of a number of UN agencies, international NGOs, and Lao organisations.98 MAG also 
provides technical advisors to the NRA (for MRE) and to UXO LAO (advisors in three 
provinces).  
 
From the EC, it obtained ECHO funding to support food security projects in Khammoune in 
2004-05 and then, in late 2004, received € 1 million from the APL thematic budget line for 
clearance in Khammoune – a project that continued until early 2008. In 2008, MAG was awarded 
a new EC grant for € 500,000 over two years. In addition to UXO clearance, this aims to build the 
capacity of provincial and district officials from the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare in 
Khammoune to set clearance priorities based on participatory approaches.  
 
UXO Lao 
In mid-2008 (after the mission to Laos), the EC and UXO Lao agreed on two grants of € 150,000 
each to support the UXO programme in Attapeu and Sekong provinces. Both projects run for two 
years, and covered risk awareness, survey, roving clearance, and area clearance (i.e. all aspects of 
UXO Lao’s provincial operations). These grants represent the first direct support from the EC to a 
public UXO agency. 




Clearly, UXO contamination represents an enormous problem within Laos. In that light, EC 
assistance to the UXO sector has been relevant to the country’s needs.  
 
EC Country Strategy Papers have noted the extent of UXO contamination and the challenge this 
creates for rural development and, particularly, development in upland areas. Thus, EC assistance 
to the UXO sector has been relevant to the problems identified in its CSPs. Given the modest 
financial and human resources available to the EC country programme, it is appropriate99 that the 
bulk of UXO funding to date has come from the APL thematic budget line or from ECHO. 
 
Given the EC has placed some priority on mine action and on supporting the APMBC, and Laos 
is not a signatory to the APMBC, the fact that EC support has been steady but modest seems to 
strike a fair balance.  
 
Efficiency 
EC assistance to the UXO sector has been steady but modest in scope. Assistance to HI does not 
garner economies of scale because that NGO has no other current donors for UXO clearance. 
MAG and UXO Lao are able to make more efficient use of EC funding – at least in terms of 
                                                     
98 MAG also provides technical assistance and funding to support the Risk Education unit in NRA. 
99 Appropriateness is similar to relevance but, when used as an evaluation criterion, generally refers to inputs rather 
than planned results. 
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EC assistance to the UXO sector also appears to be effective. For the most part, it has supported 
well established NGOs from EU member states and with extensive experience in Laos. 
 
Linking relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD) 
The sub-delegation – together with ECHO when it had an office in Laos – appear to have done an 
effective job in maintaining modest but steady support to their partners working in the UXO 
sector. LRRD was achieved with the late 2004 decision to provide the € 1 million grant to MAG, 
allowing it to continue its support – started with ECHO funding – to NGOs working on food 
security for resettled communities. 
 
Effect of deconcentration 
Deconcentration is likely to affect the planning and programming of EC support to the UXO 
sector. The sub-delegation has few staff, none of whom have specific expertise in mine action. In 
this light, channelling future support to trusted and experienced partners is a sound strategy. 
 
Coherence, Complementarity, and Coordination 
When HI and the sub-delegation learned that the € 1.5 million programmed in the APL thematic 
budget line for 2006-07 was not forthcoming, threatening continuity of the HI project, 
arrangements were made with AusAID  to provide financing for nine months. This enabled the 
sub-delegation to designate UXO contamination as one of the focus issues in the open tender for 
the Non-State Actors & Local Authorities thematic programme, which gave reasonable assurance 
that multi-year funding from the EC would be secured by HI. 
 
The role of AusAID deserves special mention. For some years, it has served as the ‘anchor donor’ 
for UXO issues in Laos. This meant that its officer responsible for the UXO portfolio was 
knowledgeable and was able to put in place ‘bridge financing’ that ensured the HI project – with 
its EC-financed assets – remained viable until the EC delegate could secure additional funding. 
The existence of an anchor donor allows other donors in a sector to be more effective, even with 
modest resources. This value-added from AusAID in the Lao UXO sector suggests: 
 
• there would be significant benefits for mine action and other ‘secondary’ development 
sectors if the EC and EU members could implement the EU Code of Conduct on 
Complementarity and Division of Labour 
• even when neither the EC nor an EU member is willing and able to serve as an anchor 
donor for a sector such as mine action within a country, they should encourage another 
donor to assume this role and, then, support that donor   
Key Strategic Issues 
 
EC programming decisions in Laos have long had to address the following strategic issues:  
 
• Laos is the most heavily bombed country on earth, with contamination heaviest in rural, 
often remote, districts 
• Laos is poor (particularly the rural population, and particularly in remote upland areas) 
but with rapid economic growth 
• NGOs from EU member states are heavily engaged in all facets of the UXO sector 
• the EU is strongly in support of mine action, but with a focus on signatories of the 
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APMBC (which Lao PDR has not signed) 
• the EC maintains only a modest aid programme in Laos 
• the EC has been represented only by a sub-delegation (which, even after it becomes a 
Delegation, will have limited human resources available) 
 
It this context, EC funding for the UXO sector has remained modest, and has come from the APL 
thematic budget line, from ECHO, and – more recently – from various thematic programmes 
rather than the country envelope. For the most part, the projects funded by the EC appear sound, 
implemented mainly by NGOs which are well established both globally and in Laos.  
 
Current and future programming also must consider the following recent developments: 
 
• the APL thematic budget line has been terminated, and Laos is ineligible for the closest 
alternative (the Instrument for Stability) 
• the performance of the UXO sector has significantly increased in recent years 
• the Government has instituted reforms to strengthen the UXO sector 
• both the NSEDP and the NGPES place priority on the UXO programme, which largely 
operates in the priority 47 very poor districts and is one of the three national poverty 
eradication programmes 
• increasing evidence suggests that UXO contamination accentuates poverty, while UXO 
clearance is correlated with poverty reduction 
• the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) was signed in Oslo by 94 countries, 
including Lao PDR (which was one of four countries that immediately ratified) 
 
Lacking much flexibility within its geographic envelope, the sub-delegation has shown ingenuity 
in obtaining modest amounts of funding for UXO sector. The five most recent projects have all 
been funded via thematic programmes. However, given that Lao PDR is a signatory of the CCM, 
plus the increased priority given to the UXO sector by the Government, the case for additional 
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OTHER ASIA-PACIFIC COUNTRIES 
SRI LANKA 
Two decades of armed conflict between the government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam 
(LTTE) has left Sri Lanka with extensive contamination from mines and ERW. Government 
figures from 2006 (i.e. before the August 2006 collapse of the February 2002 ceasefire) showed 
about 560 villages were affected. The northern Jaffna peninsula, is the most severely affected 
area, with at least 228 villages impacted,100 but other areas in the north-east are also affected. 
 
Landmines are but one of the inter-related 
challenges people in the North and East. The long 
conflict has resulted in extensive population 
displacement, which was further aggrevated by the 
December 2004 tsunami that killed 35,000 and 
destroyed 80,000 homes. As a result, there are an 
estimated 600,000 IDPs whose reurn is hampered by 
the continuing conflict and, in many cases, by 
landmines.  
The Mine Action Program 
In 1998, UNICEF began an MRE programme in 
Jaffna that was absorbed the next year by a UNDP 
project, which also included survey and emergency 
clearance. Due to an escalation of the conflict, this 
project was suspended in 2000. 
 
Mine action started again following the February 2002 ceasefire. UNICEF and UNHCR re-started 
MRE activities while the World Bank granted $1 million to the UNDP to start a new demining 
programme, which included components to build local capacities and develop a national structure 
to coordinate mine action activities. This led to the establishment of the National Steering 
Committee for Mine Action (NSCMA) in August 2002. HALO Trust, MAG, FSD, and NPA101 
also started activities in that year, and DDG followed in 2003. 
 
Renewed conflict in mid-2006 led the government to focus mine/UXO clearance on the Eastern 
province where its security forces retook control of large areas previously held by the LTTE. 
Government efforts have attempted to coordinate emergency demining in these areas to expedite 
resettlement of IDPs, reconstruction, and development. At the same time, operators have 
complained of abductions of deminers in areas controlled by security forces or pro-government 
militias. Some deminers working in LTTE-controlled territory were forcibly recruited into “local 
security forces.” Operators also faced constraints in moving Tamil deminers to different districts. 
Recently, NPA stopped its demining programme and then pulled-out entirely from Sri Lanka 
because of restrictions imposed by the Government, which accused NPA of being pro-LTTE.  
 
International support for mine action in Sri Lanka has waxed and waned in an inverse relationship 
with the level of conflict. 
 
                                                     
100 These figures exclude High Security Zones (HSZ), which are often protected by a defensive minefields. 
101 NPA worked with the Humanitarian Demining Unit (HDU) of the Sri Lankan Army. 
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EC Development Cooperation & Support for Mine Action 
The EC frames its relations with Sri Lanka as economic co-operation based on mutual interests 
and benefits, rather than more narrowly on development co-operation.103 Regardless, relations in 
recent years have been dominated by the conflict and the need to address the needs of the many 
war-affected people, together with the emergency response to the December 2004 tsunami.  
 
Since the February 2002 ceasefire, the EC has provided significant funding for mine action in Sri 
Lanka. Until 2005, most EC funding came via ECHO.104 However, by early 2004, ECHO, 
RELEX and AIDCO agreed that responsibility for funding mine action should be assumed by the 
latter two agencies.105 In 2004 RELEX began funding mine action projects in Sri Lanka, drawing 
both on the APL thematic budget line and that for Rehabilitation and Reconstruction in Favour of 
Asian Developing Countries (19 10 04).  
 
In 2005, following the tsunami, ECHO again funded some mine action projects, including € 
800,000 for post-tsunami demining (survey and clearance) and € 200,000 for mine action 
technical assistance capacity in the field.106 In 2008 ECHO again resumed funding to support 
demining in support of the resettlement of IDPs. In the current year, the Delegation also began 
funding MRE, victim assistance, and advocacy. 
 
In total, the EC has provided over € 14 million for mine action in Sri Lanka since early 2002, 
with both ECHO and RELEX accounting for about 47% of the total and only 6% coming from 
the AIDCO geographic envelope for Sri Lanka. According to Landmine Monitor data, the EC 
provided about 37% of all mine action funding for Sri Lanka in the start-up period of the 
programme (2002-04), with the EC contribution dropping to under 10% of the total since then. 
                                                     
102 Landmine Monitor, various years 
103 The EC and Sri Lanka: Cooperation Strategy 2002-06. 
104 In 2002, RELEX also provided € 800,000 for Landmine Impact Survey and clearance via budget line B7-303 – 
Rehabilitation and reconstruction in favour of Asian developing countries. 
105 See ECHO, Humanitarian Aid Decision: 23 02 01, decision reference number ECHO/-SA/BUD/2004/01000, p. 9. 
106 Records provided by the EC also show €1.57 million from ECHO to HI-F for mine victim assistance for 2005-07. 
This seems to represent a series of ECHO grants to HI-F for support to the disabled in general. If so, most of this would 
not properly be classified as mine action and it is not reflected in the Graph. 
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The Burmese/Myanmar government forces and a number of ethnic armed 
groups continue to lay antipersonnel mines in significant numbers. 
Landmines are concentrated on its borders with Bangladesh, India and 
Thailand, and in eastern parts of the country 
 
No humanitarian demining programs are known to exist, although there are 
reports of sporadic clearance by the military and of ‘village demining’ (i.e. 
informal demining). As well, a number of agencies have reported ‘atrocity 
demining’ (i.e. civilians being forced to carry or remove mines against 
their will; to clear brush in suspected mined areas, etc.).  
 
In 2007, at least 438 new mine/ERW casualties were reported to Landmine 
Monitor, a significant increase from the 243 casualties reported in 2006. 
Operating in Thailand, the ICRC, Handicap International, and other 
international NGOs provide assistance to civilian war casualties and others 
with disabilities from Burma/Myanmar. 
 
In 2003-04, the EC funded three mine action projects based in Thailand for people from Burma/ 
Myanmar. 
 
• € 500,000 to the ICRC for prosthetics, MRE and advocacy 
• € 200,000 in 2003 to HI for MRE and victim assistance, followed by another € 250,000 
the following year 
KEY ISSUES 
The case of Sri Lanka illustrates how quickly the EC can respond with substantial funding via 
ECHO. While this funding is for humanitarian emergencies, it can be used to capitalise on 
openings, such as peace process that emerged following the unilateral ceasefire declaration by the 
LTTE in December 2001.  
 
Sri Lanka also provides a good example of how the various EC directorates can coordinate for 
LRRD purposes. The existence of the APL thematic budget line, plus other global or regional 
budget lines (e.g. 19 10 04 – Rehabilitation and Reconstruction in Favour of Asian Developing 
Countries) seemed to provide the flexibility for RELEX and AIDCO to assume responsibility for 
initiatives started with ECHO funding. 
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7. OVERALL CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
In the following, overall conclusions for the Asia-Pacific region are derived from the observations 
from individual countries, and from the analysis of cross-country data. Where appropriate, 
conclusions are followed by one or more recommendations. 
RELEVANCE 
To recipient country needs 
Burma/Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos, and Sri Lanka are all seriously impacted from explosives 
contamination. In all cases, the contamination tends to have a disproportionate impact on poor 
and vulnerable groups: rural poor in general; refugees and internally displaced people from 
countries in conflict; and people subject to resettlement following a conflict or due to a 
development project. Problems with mine/UXO contamination have been highlighted in key 
development or (for Sri Lanka107) reconstruction strategies. As such, EC assistance to mine action 
has been relevant to the needs of these countries. 
 
There are questions, however, regarding the scale of EC support to mine action relative to the 
scale of the problems in many Asia-Pacific countries. The regional EC-funding targets for mine 
action were achieved in both APL Strategy periods, but these targets were themselves modest and 
– for 2005-07 – envisaged funding only from the APL budget line. 
 
Mainland South-East Asia is the region with the world’s worst explosives contamination 
problem. In spite of this fact, relatively small sums were programmed for EC mine action funding 
to the Asia-Pacific region. Part of the reason for this is that EC country envelopes to Asia-Pacific 
countries are rather modest, which presumably reflects South-East Asia’s strategic importance to 
the EU and the fact that mine action tends to be a non-focal issue even in heavily contaminated 
countries. However, only 11% of the APL budget line funds were indicatively programmed for 
South-East Asia.  
 


























                                                     
107 The Re-awakening of the East Programme 
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Thematic instruments targeting a humanitarian and development issue, such as the APL budget 
line, provide the EC with an opportunity to address problems on a more coherent basis from a 
global perspective. As such, allocations should reflect humanitarian needs and development 
opportunities in the affected countries more than the strategic importance of a country to the EU. 
 
The APL budget line has been terminated. However, earlier reports on regional evaluations of 
EC-funded mine action support have recommended that the EC explore options for some sort of 
funding ‘window’ for mine action support within existing budget instruments. As well, the new 
Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) may add impetus to efforts to create an enhanced 
mechanism for EC financial support to countries heavily impacted by explosives contamination. 
 
Recommendation – Should an enhanced mechanism be created for EC financial support to 
address explosives contamination problems, indicative programming allocations should be based 
mainly on the basis of needs and opportunities rather than the strategic importance of a country to 
the EU. 
To EC Country and Regional Strategy Papers & NIPs/MIPs 
EC strategy and programming documents for most of these countries have also highlighted the 
explosives contamination problems.108 Thus, EC assistance to mine action has also been relevant 
from the perspective of EC strategy and programming documents. 
To the EC Regional Strategy for Asia: 2007-2013 
One component of this strategy for ASEAN members is Cooperation and Policy Reform in the 
Field of Security, which highlights border security. Demining would be an important supporting 
element to the implementation of any agreement to resolve border issues, including the current 
dispute between Cambodia and Thailand. As such, EC support to a cross-border demining 
initiative could be extremely relevant to this component of the EC Regional Strategy. 
 
Recommendation – The EC should advise ASEAN Foreign Ministers that its programme on 
Cooperation and Policy Reform in the Field of Security, which highlights border security, could 
support cross-border demining/explosives ordnance disposal (EOD) initiatives when such actions 
are needed to allow the permanent demarcation of borders between ASEAN member states. 
To the Priorities Defined in the APL Strategies for 2002-2004 and 2005-2007 
 
APL Strategy for 2002-04 
EC financing to mine action in Asia-Pacific was consistent with the MIP for 2002-04 in all cases 
except Cambodia. The MIP had programme € 5 million from budget line B7-300 (Cooperation to 
Development – Asia) plus € 500,000 from the APL thematic budget line. The € 5 million 
programme for ‘mine clearance’ in the APL Strategy eventually shrunk to € 1.17 million by the 
time the contract was signed in late 2007 (the remainder went to land titling). The € 500,000 for 
TA to CMAA was never utilised for Cambodia (it may have been made available to Laos). 
 
APL Strategy for 2005-07 
Once again, less mine action funding was provided for Cambodia (€ 1 million) than had 
originally been programmed (€ 1.5 million). As well, the € 1.5 million programmed for Laos 
from the APL thematic budget line never materialised, which caused difficulties for the sub-
Delegation and its implementing partners. 
                                                     
108 The EC Strategy Paper for Burma/Myanmar: 2007-2013 includes only incidental remarks on landmine 
contamination. 
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EFFICIENCY 
In many cases, EC grants have been too small and too short in duration to garner economies of 
scale (i.e. efficiency) on their own. This is not a problem when the recipient has many donors and 
can achieve scale economies from a pool of funds, which is often the case for UN agencies and 
some of the well-established international mine action NGOs. The issue is of particular relevance 
to ECHO, as it often has to cover the initial equipment costs but can only provide funding for 
short-durations.  
EFFECTIVENESS 
EC support to mine action operators appears to have been effective. For the most part, the EC has 
funded experienced international NGOs that are based in EU member states. 
 
Pre-2002 EC assistance for capacity development of national organs in Cambodia was adjudged 
to have been less effective, and the EC provided only modest support to capacity development 
since 2002. Thus, EC assistance has been ineffective in terms of fostering national ownership and 
the development of local capacities in the Asia-Pacific region. 
DECONCENTRATION AND THE END OF THE APL BUDGET LINE 
Deconcentration will have significant effects – both positive and negative – on EC assistance in 
Asia-Pacific countries.109 For non-focal issues such as mine action, it appears likely to have a 
negative impact as the (sub-) Delegations do not have the staff resources to monitor developments 
in these programmes.  
 
The recently-issued Guidelines on European Community Mine Action 2008-2013 will assist to a 
degree. However, the elimination of the APL thematic budget line, coupled with the reduction in 
the complement of headquarters staff working on mine action, means that Brussels will not be in 
a position to provide expert guidance.  
 
Recommendation – In addition to the new Guidelines on European Community Mine Action, EC 
headquarters should identify and pre-qualify a roster of mine action experts who could provide 
technical advice to delegates in mine-affected countries who are responsible for mine action. 
DONOR COORDINATION 
Donor coordination often represents a major problem for the EC in Asia-Pacific. The human and 
financial resources available to the (sub-) Delegations in the region are, for the most part, modest. 
At the same time, efforts to implement the Paris Declaration and enhance aid effectiveness 
typically raise aid management transaction costs in the short-term (i.e. until General Budget 
Support schemes and Programme Based Approaches can be formulated and agreed). This has 
been the case in Cambodia and, to a lesser extent, in Laos, making it extremely difficult for the 
(sub-) Delegation to adequately cover non-focus sectors. As well in Cambodia, the position 
responsible for mine action was vacant for two years. 
 
In recent years, AusAID has served as an ‘anchor donor’ for mine action in both Cambodia and 
Laos, with knowledgeable and experienced personnel plus medium-term financial commitments 
and some flexibility in how these are allocated. In Laos for example, AusAID was able to step-in 
quickly to keep the HI UXO programme running when the sub-Delegation learned that the funds 
programmed for Laos from the APL budget line would not be forthcoming. AusAID ‘bridge 
                                                     
109 Positive and negative effects are discussed in the Evaluation of EC-Funded Mine Action Programmes in Africa, p. 
36. 
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finance’ allowed the sub-Delegation to explore other funding possibilities, which eventually 
proved successful. This experience suggests that there would be significant benefits if the EC 
Delegations and EU member state embassies could implement the EU Code of Conduct on 
Complementarity and Division of Labour. 
 
Recommendation – In all explosives contaminated Asia-Pacific countries, the EC should meet 
with representatives from EU member states to agree who should take the lead in the mine action 
sector, in line with the EU Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labour. 
 
In recent years, two joint UXO sector evaluations have been commissioned in Laos (by UNDP 
and UXO Lao/NRA) and a joint donor evaluation on the mine action sector was commissioned in 
Cambodia. Such sector-wide evaluations have many advantages over individual project 
evaluations, and generally provide a better basis for programming decisions. These exercises also 
provide a good opportunity for marginal donors to a national mine action programme – such as 
the EC in both Cambodia and Laos – to assess programming options in a more strategic manner. 
 
Recommendation – EC delegations, ideally in conjunction with donor representatives from EU 
member states in the country, should encourage and support sector-wide evaluations of national 
mine action programmes, and take the outcomes from such evaluations into consideration when 
making programming decisions. 
COORDINATION AMONG EC AGENCIES FOR LRRD 
Coordination among ECHO, RELEX and AIDCO to link relief, rehabilitation and development 
(LRRD) appears to have worked reasonably well in Sri Lanka and Laos. In Sri Lanka, funds from 
the APL thematic budget line and from that for Rehabilitation and Reconstruction in Favour of 
Asian Developing Countries (19 10 04) were used when ECHO funding to mine action in that 
country stopped after 2004. ECHO funding to mine action resumed in the wake of the tsunami, 
and to provide demining support to resettlement of IDPs, but this simply reflects the rapid 
evolution of many emergencies. 
 
In Laos, the sub-Delegation did not allocate funds from its geographic envelope to support ECHO 
mine action initiatives, but it was able to arrange APL thematic funding and funds from other 
thematic programmes for this purpose. 
 
LRRD – at least in the context of EC development agencies continuing support for ECHO-
financed initiatives – was not achieved in Cambodia. In spite of a positive evaluation of ECHO 
funded projects with a number of NGO operators (and a clear recommendation for continued 
support to these initiatives), the sub-Delegation decided not to continue support to standalone 
mine action projects. From a broader perspective however, the sub-Delegation’s decision to 
incorporate funds for mine action within a large IRD project seems both appropriate and a good 
example of LRRD. Unfortunately, an inadequate project design coupled with inflexible EC 
procedures (such as the D+3 rule) resulted in problems at the start-up of the demining component 
of the IRD project. 
 
Recommendation – The EC should put a greater emphasis on the challenge of LRRD related to 
demining, and should consider a specific sector sub-strategy for demining and LRRD. Given the 
importance of ECHO funding in the early stages of many mine action programmes, DG ECHO 
should consider a focal point for mine action at its headquarters to achieve this aim. 
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APPENDIX 1 – TERMS OF REFERENCE 
 




In 2001 the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament adopted two Regulations on the 
reinforcement of the EU response against Antipersonnel Landmines (APL).110 These (referred to 
collectively as “the Regulation”) laid the foundation of the European integrated and focused 
policy.  
 
Article 13, paragraph 1 of the EC Regulation states that: The Commission shall regularly assess 
operations financed by the Community in order to establish whether the objectives of the 
operations have been achieved and to provide guidelines for improving the effectiveness of future 
operations. 
 
The APL Regulation goes on to state: Every three years after entry into force of this Regulation, 
the Commission shall submit to the European Parliament an overall assessment of all Community 
mine actions… (Article 14) 
 
The EC Mine Action Strategy and Multi-annual Indicative Programme, 2005-2007111 further 
specifies that “more specific, geographic, evaluations of EC-funded mine actions, analysing the 
results and their impact” will be undertaken to complement the overall assessment. 
 
To implement these provisions, the EC: 
 
3. Commissioned a global assessment of EC mine policy and actions over the period 2002-
2004; 
4. Entered into an agreement with The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining 
(GICHD) to, inter alia, manage the programme of regional evaluations to identify lessons 
learned within EC-funded mine action projects in the following regions:112 
 
• Africa • Caucasus-Central Asia • Latin America 
• Asia-Pacific • Europe • Middle East 
 
The Report from the Global Assessment was issued in March 2005,113 while the agreement with 
the GICHD was concluded in December that year.  
                                                     
110 Regulation (EC) 1724/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2001 concerning action 
against anti-personnel landmines in developing countries (OJ L 234, 1.9.2001, p.1) and Regulation (EC) 1725/2001 of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2001 concerning action against anti-personnel landmines in third 
countries other than developing countries (OJ L 234, 1.9.2001, p.6). The provisions are similar and we quote from 
Regulation (EC) 1724/2001. 
111 This is the second strategy and multi-year indicative programme since the adoption of the EC Regulation: the first 
covered the period 2002-04.  
112 Additional objectives of the EC-GICHD Agreement are to: 
• provide a repository and dissemination service for reports from mine action evaluations and similar studies; 
• train people from mine affected countries in evaluation; 
• support the participation of key players from mine-affected countries in official meetings relating to the Mine 
Ban Treaty (MBT). 
113 Gasser, Russell and Robert Keeley, Global Assessment of EC Mine Policy and Actions: 2002-2004. 
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2. DESCRIPTION OF THE EVALUATION 
 
The general objective of the Global Assessment was to determine to what extent the objectives 
and means set in the APL Regulation had been complied with and used in terms of strategy, 
programming, commitments and implementation. The regional evaluations will complement the 
Global Assessment by focusing on (i) relevant conclusions and recommendations from the Global 
Assessment, and (ii) EC mine action strategy and programming issues at the country level. Thus, 
the evaluation will not assess the efficiency, effectiveness, and impact of individual projects, 
except to illustrate changes since the Global Assessment or critical programming issues.  
 
Overall objective:  
 
To provide systematic and objective assessments of EC-funded mine actions in the Asia-Pacific 
region to generate credible and useful lessons for decision-makers within the EC, allowing them 
to improve the planning and management of existing and future mine action projects, 
programmes, and policies. 
 
Specific objectives:  
 
− To assess the relevance of EC-funded mine activities vis-à-vis: 
o the geographic and thematic priorities defined in the Strategies for 2002-2004 and 2005-
2007; 
o national and regional needs, strategies, and priorities; 
o EC Country Strategy Papers and National Indicative Programmes for mine-affected 
countries in the Asia-Pacific region 2002-2006; 
o EC strategy documents for the Asia-Pacific region 
− To analyze the allocation of EC funds among mine-affected states in the Asia-Pacific region, 
and across the various components of mine action (survey, clearance, MRE, etc.);114 
− To assess the effectiveness of EC-funded mine action support in: 
o addressing the landmine & UXO problems in mine-affected partner countries 
o fostering national ownership and the development of local capacities; 
o supporting the overall development and rehabilitation priorities/ programmes of the 
beneficiary countries;  
o supporting local mine action organisations; 
− To assess the coordination among the EC and other agencies supporting mine action in a 
country (regional; national; UN; donors; international NGOs; etc.); 
− To assess the impact of deconcentration on the planning and delivery of EC support to mine 
action in the Asia-Pacific region, including the capacity of EC delegations to assess proposals 
for mine action projects and to monitor/evaluate the implementation of these projects; 
− To assess the adequacy of the EC national strategies and plans, and the effectiveness of 
implementation; 
− To assess the existence of an ‘exit strategy’ for the country to graduate from donor assistance 
(including plans for sustainability); 
− To assess the linkages between mine action and other issues, such as humanitarian assistance, 
development, and armed violence reduction 
                                                     
114 This question addresses, among other issues, the fact that “Commitment to the Mine Ban Treaty” is one of the 
criteria listed in the EC Mine Action Strategy 2005-2007 for determining geographic allocations.  
 
 Page iii 
− To assess the impact of the end of the specific budget line for anti-personnel landmines and 
the introduction of the new “stability instrument” on future mine action support from the EC 
to the Asia-Pacific region; 
− To make recommendations to improve the identification, design, and implementation of EC-
funded mine projects; 
− To generate recommendations to enhance the opportunities for cross-fertilization among 




The evaluation report shall give an overview of EC mine action support to the Asia-Pacific 
region, and to particular mine-affected countries in the region, since 2002. It shall incorporate 
more detailed assessments of EC mine action support in a limited number of ‘focus country’ cases 
to illustrate and support its findings, conclusions, and recommendations. Recommendations will 
aim in particular to guide EC personnel in designing and implementing programmes of support to 
mine action that complement the actions of other actors, including national authorities, other 




The evaluation shall entail the following main components of work: 
 
− Preliminary Planning & Data Collection (now underway) 
− Desk Research 
− Country Missions  
o Cambodia 
o Lao PDR 




As the evaluation will not focus on the performance of individual projects, Evaluation Team 
members will spend most or all of their time in capitals and major centres to meet with and 
collect documents and data from: 
 
• EC delegations 
• national authorities and officials from national mine action centres 
• UN agencies supporting mine action 
• representatives from other major donors to mine action in that country 
• representatives from mine action operators (local and international) 
• other key government officials  
• representatives from key regional organisation (where present).  
 
Additional data collection 
 
Additional information will be obtained from: 
  
− Review of project documents (project proposals and contracts; mid-term and final reports, as 
well as final evaluations, monitoring reports, audit reports, etc., where available; 
− Interviews with relevant Commission officials (in Brussels);  
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− Questionnaire surveys and some follow-up telephone interviews with project 
managers/implementers/recipients of EC funds and projects (Officials in other EC 
Delegations, managers of operator organizations, both in organizations’ headquarters and on 
the field, and beneficiary countries’ officials, etc.). 
− EC Country Strategy Papers and National Indicative Programmes. 
− National Development Plans, Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, and National Mine Action 
Strategies from the focus countries 
− Relevant reports from the UN (including inter-agency assessment mission reports for mine 
action) and the World Bank 
− Recent mine action evaluations commissioned by other agencies 




An evaluation work plan will be prepared and distributed following the preliminary planning and 
data collection stage. 
 
A debriefing of preliminary findings and conclusions will be provided to EC officials and other 
stakeholders at the end of each country mission. 
 
Within one month of the end of the country missions, a draft report will be prepared and 
distributed to the GICHD and EC delegations for comments, and subsequently distributed to other 
stakeholders. For both comments the deadline is two weeks. 
 
A final report will be submitted to the EC Brussels. 
 
All reports will be in English. 
 
All reports will clearly indicate on the cover page that the evaluation was financed by the 
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Annex 1 to the ToR 
 
Among the key conclusions of the Global Assessment were: 
 
• The need for a transparent process for determining which countries and projects will 
receive EC funding for mine action; 
• In light of ‘deconcentration’, the need to clarify “who does what” in mine action within 
the EC; 
• Request for proposal and selection processes, including: 
• The need for more high quality proposals, 
• The need to reduce the number of proposals rejected on technicalities, and 
• The need for more rigorous assessments – including technical criteria – of proposals 
and projects.  
• Contracting issues, including: 
• The need for greater contractual rigour in specifying performance requirements; 
• The need for greater clarity in defining the chains of responsibility and authority; 
• The limitations inherent in the use of non-renewable contracts issued for short 
durations. 
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APPENDIX 2 –PERSONS MET 
CAMBODIA 
Note – To reduce costs, Ted Paterson (TP) and Dr. Mao Vanna (MV) conducted research on 
other initiatives in addition to the Country Mission for the EC Regional Evaluation. Meetings 
unrelated to the EC Evaluation are not shown. Meetings for multiple purposes are marked thus *. 
16-17 February 2008 – TP fly Geneva  Phnom Penh 
18-20 February – TP & MV in Phnom Penh 
H.E. Leng Sochea, Deputy Secretary General CMAA* 
Chan Rotha, Director, Socio-Economic Planning & Database 
MAG* Rupert Leighton, Country Director 
Tim Porter, Programme Manager 
18 Feb 
HALO Trust* 
Richard Grindle, Finance Manager 
19 Feb TWG Meeting* H.E. Prak Sokhonn, Deputy Prime Minister & Chair, plus members 
20 Feb CWARS Sam Oeurn Pok, Managing Director 
20 Feb – TP & MV fly Phnom Penh  Siem Reap 
Chan Saruth, National Project Director 
Philippe Becu, Acting Team Leader, ITAT 
Ab Koster, Intern’l Civil Engineering Advisor 
Oum Sang Onn, Key Mine Action Expert (CMAC) 
Norm Sinath, Senior Mine Action Officer 
Keo Chhunly, Senior Land Titling Officer 
ECOSORN 
Chueang Viola, Senior Secretary 
20 Feb 
CMAC Oum Sang Onn, Key Mine Action Expert (dinner) 
21 Feb National holiday  
22 Feb ECOSORN As 20 Feb above 
 EIC Dy Phalla, Senior M & E Expert (assigned to ECOSORN) 
22 Feb – TP & MV fly Siem Reap  Phnom Penh  
23-24 Feb – weekend 
25 Feb UNDP* Steve Munroe, Senior Programme Officer 
26 Feb EC Koen Evereart, Officer responsible for ECOSORN 
HI-F Lucile Papon, Country Director 
H.E. Heng Rattana, Deputy Director General CMAC 
Oum Phumro, Director of Planning & Operations 
27 Feb 
EIC Dourng Kakada, Senior Researcher 
28 Feb MAG* Rupert Leighton, Country Director 
 HI-B* Hugo Hotte, Mine Action Programme Manager 
29 Feb Writing report  
1-2 March 2008 – TP fly Phnom Penh  Geneva   
Follow-up meetings (TP & MV mission of 19 April–3 May and 18-29 August 2008) 
Oum Sang Onn, Key Mine Action Expert (CMAC) 27 Apr ECOSORN 
Norm Sinath, Senior Mine Action Officer 
28 Apr ECOSORN Manfred Staab, Team Leader, ITAT 
H.E. Heng Rattana, Deputy Director General 29 Apr CMAC* 
Oum Phumro, Director of Planning & Operations 
2 May EC Bangkok Andrew Jacobs, Head of Operations 
Aldo Biondi, Head of Regional Support Office 2 May ECHO Bangkok* 
Onpreeya Chitpakdee, Regional Programme Assistant 
Steve Munroe, Programme Officer for Mine Action 29 Aug UNDP* 
Dylan Gelard, Contracts 
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LAOS 
 
May 2005, Bangkok (following mission to Cambodia) 
Overview of EC aid Andrew Jacobs, EC Bangkok Friday 
01.05.08 Overview of ECHO in Lao PDR Aldo Biondi, ECHO Bangkok 
Saturday & Sunday, 14-15 June 2008 – T. Paterson & E. Tollefsen fly Geneva  Vientiane  
Introduction to MAGs activities David Hayter, MAG Monday, 
16.06.08 Reception at BACTEC BACTEC, UNDP, Australian Embassy, 
Oxiana 
NRA database and IMSMA Beat Schoch and Khammoungkhoun 
Southivong, NRA 
General briefing on strategy for the UXO 
sector for joint UNDP and EC evaluation 
team 
NRA, UXO LAO, FSD, US Embassy, 
UNICEF, WFP, BACTEC, Hi-B, MAG, 
AusAID, UNDP  
Lunch meeting with UNDP and NRA Stephan Vigie, Mariko Harado, Tim Horner + 
Somnuk Vorasarn, Deputy Director, NRA and 
UNDP evaluation team 
Tuesday 
17.06.08 
Planning, accreditation and QA/QC Phil Bean, NRA/ArmorGroup 
Briefing on UXO victims survey Mike Boddington, NRA/COPE Wednesday 
18.06.08 Briefing on EC funded projects David Hayter, MAG 
Briefing on AusAID funding of the UXO 
sector 
Warren Hoye and Sounisa Sundara AusAID 
+ UNDP evaluation team 
Briefing on UXO LAO work and strategy John Dingley, UXO LAO/UNDP 
Coordination of the UXO sector in Laos Bounphone Sayaseth, UXO LAO 
Thursday 
19.06.08 
Dinner meeting on Mine Action sector Tim Horner, NRA/UNDP 
Information of WFP involvement in priority 
setting for UXO clearance 
Julie Spooner, WFP 
Quality Management in UXO LAO Marco Heuscher, ArmorGroup/UXO LAO 
Friday 
20.06.08 
FSD operations in Laos Tony Fish and Nigel Orr, FSD 
Sunday, 22.06.08 – Travel with HI-B from VTE to Sepon  
Monday 
23.06.08 
Visit to HI-B PCA, clearance and MRE teams 




Visit MAG clearance teams and previously 
EC funded projects in Khammuone Province. 
MAG 
Meeting with EC mine action sector 
coordinator in Laos 
Francesco Straniero, EC Wednesday 
25.06.08 
Briefing on the MRE sector in Laos Thongdy Phommavongsa and Ruth 
Bottomley, NRA 
Briefing on HI-Bs programme in Laos and 
feedback from field visit 
Luc Delneuville and Kim Warren, HI-B. Thursday 
26.06.08 
Dinner with FSD Tony Fish, FSD 
Friday 
27.06.08 
Meet with UXO Sector Assessment Team 
(dinner) 
Bob Griffin, Robert Keeley, plus Mariko 
Harado (UNDP) 
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APPENDIX 3 – LIST OF DOCUMENTS CONSULTED 
FOR CAMBODIA 
EC & EC PROJECT DOCUMENTS 
 
Country Strategy Paper – 2004-2006: Cambodia 
 
Cambodia – European Community : Strategy Paper for the period 2007-2013. 
 
Eaton, Paul, Preparation of Terms of Reference for Contract and/or tender documents on Result 5 
‘Access to Land’: Mission Report of the ISTA Land Specialist, ECOSORN, 13 March 2007 
 
ECOSORN, Result 5: SAL (Safer Access to Land, presentation slides, Siem Reap, (not dated but 
delivered on 20 February 2008) 
 
_____, Annex II: Terms of Reference (Annex to the Tender for Safer access to arable lands and 
social infrastructures through implementation of mine risk reduction strategies with related 
activities for ECOSORN Project) 
 
EU Code of Conduct on Complementarity and the Division of Labour, European Commission, 
May 2007. 
 
European Union Road Map for Increased Aid Effectiveness in Cambodia (no date) 
 
Financing Agreement between the European Community and the Royal Government of 
Cambodia: Economic and Social Relaunch of Northwest Provinces, Financing Agreement 
No. 16793, KHM/AIDCO/2004/16793. (last signature, 18 June 2005) 
 
IEPELA, Community participation to actions related to antipersonnel mines: Grant Application 
Form (Budget line 19 02 04; Europaid/125980/L/ACT/KH), November 2007 
 
Multi-Annual Indicative Programme for Asia: 2007-2010 
 
Multi-Annual Indicative Programme: 2007-2010 – Cambodia 
 
Regional Programming for Asia – Strategy Document: 2007-2013 
MINE ACTION DOCUMENTS 
 
ArmorGroup, Review of the Mine Action Sector in Cambodia for the European Commission, 
2003a 
 
ArmorGroup, Evaluation of the Technical Assistance Project for the Development of the 
Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA), 2003b 
 
Bolton, M., Praivan Limpanboon, and Chhim Vanak, 2003, LUPU Project Evaluation, Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, France. 
 
 
 Page ix 
Bottomley, Ruth, A study on the dramatic decrease in mine/UXO casualties in 2006 in 
Cambodia, CMVIS, HI-B, NPA, and UNICEF for CMAA, February 2007 
 
_____, Crossing the Divide: Landmines, Villagers and Organisations, PRIO Report 1/2003, 
International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO), 2003 
 
_____ Spontaneous Demining Initiatives: Mine Clearance by Villagers in Rural Cambodia, 
Handicap International-Belgium, 2001 
 
CMAA, National Strategy on Explosive Remnants of War (ERW); 2008-2015, (Final Draft of 12 
September 2006), November 2007 
 
_____, Five Year Mine Action Plan: 2005-2009, 3rd Edition, April 2005 
 
_____, National Mine Action Strategy, 2004 
 
CMVIS, Cambodia Mine/UXO Victim Information System: Annual Report 2006, Cambodian Red 
Cross and Handicap International-Belgium, 2007. 
 
Durocher, Marcel, Agim Hoti, Mok Tonh, Keo Vuthy, Evaluation Report on ECHO funded 
Humanitarian Mine Action Pilot Projects in North-West of Cambodia, ECHO, October 2003 
  
Gildestad, B., Cost-Benefit Analysis of Mine Clearance Operations in Cambodia, February 2005. 
  
Griffen, R. and R. Keeley, 2004, Joint Evaluation of Mine Action in Cambodia for the Donor 
Working Group on Mine Action, [two volumes] 
 
ICBL, Landmine Monitor, various year 
 
Instituto de Estudios Políticos para América Latina y África (IEPALA) and Cambodian 
Cambodian War Amputees Rehabilitation Society (CWARS), ____________ 
 
Meindersma, C., A. Sprangemeijer, , G. Gisbers, T. Sweijs, and Mao Vanna, Evaluation of the 
Netherlands’ financial assistance for humanitarian demining activities in 1996-2006: 
Cambodia, HCSS-07-004r, Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, September 2007. 
 
Moyes, R., Tampering: Deliberate handling and use of live ordnance in Cambodia, (report for 
Handicap International-Belgium, Mines Advisory Group, and Norwegian People’s Aid, 2004 
 
Meindersma, C., A. Sprangemeijer, G. Gijsbers, T. Sweijs, and Mao Vanna, 2007, Evaluation of 
the Netherlands’ Financial Assistance for Humanitarian Demining Activities in 1996-2006: 
Cambodia, The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies 
 
Mine Action Investment Database, http://www.mineactioninvestments.org/frameset.asp  
 
Paterson, Ted, Capacity Development in Mine Action: The Case of Cambodia, internal report for 
GICHD, 2004. 
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ROYAL GOVERNMENT OF CAMBODIA  
Laws & decrees 
Royal Decree No. 177, [establishing CMAA], 6 September 2000 
 
Land Law, [No. 14 of 2001], 30 August 2001. 
 
Sub-decree No. 76, [organisation and functioning of CMAA], 8 August 2001 
 
Sub-decree No. 19, [Social Land Concessions], 19 March 2003 
 
Sub-decree No. 70, [socio-economic management of mine clearance operations], 20 October 
2004 
Other RGC Documents 
 
Action Plan on Harmonization, Alignment, and Results : 2006-2010 
 
Cambodia Aid Effectiveness Report 2007, (Prepared for the Cambodia Development Cooperation 
Forum, June 2007) 
 
Cambodia Millennium Development Goals (excerpt from the Human Development Report), 2003 
 
National Strategic Development Plan 2006-2010, Council of Ministers, January 2006 
 
Strategic Framework for Development Cooperation Management, January 2006 
 
The Rectangular Strategy for Growth, Employment, Equity and Efficiency in Cambodia, (address 
by Samdech Hun Sen, Prime Minister), July 2004 
FOR LAOS 
GOVERNMENT OF THE LAO PEOPLES DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC 
 
(2006) National Socio-Economic Development Plan: 2006-2010 
 
(2004) National Growth and Poverty Eradication Strategy 
 
Committee for Planning and Investment, Department of International Cooperation (2007a) 
Achievements, Constraints and Future Direction within the Implementation of the 
National Socio-Economic Development Plan 2006-2010  
 
 _____ (2007b) 
Report on the Round Table Implementation Meeting 
UXO SECTOR 
 
Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (2005) 
A Study of Scrap Metal Collection in Lao PDR 
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Government of Lao PDR (2004)  
National Strategic Plan for the UXO Programme in Lao PDR: The Safe Path Forward 
 
Griffin et al (2008) 
UXO Sector Evaluation – Lao PDR 
 
Keeley et al (2002)  
Mission to Assess Future Sustainable Options of the Lao UXO Trust Fund and the UXO 
LAO Mine Action Programme 
 
Keeley, Robert (2007) 
An Evaluation of the Integrated UXO Threat Reduction Project in Savannakhet Province, 
Lao PDR 
 
National Regulatory Authority (2008) 
UXO Sector Annual Report 2007 
 
UXO Lao (2006?) 
Claiming the Future – UXO Lao Strategic Plan (2006-13) 
OTHER 
 
Government of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic and the Partners in Development (2006) 
Vientiane Declaration on Aid Effectiveness 
 
IMF and World Bank (2004) 
Joint Staff Advisory Note of the PRSP 
 
World Bank (2006)  
Lao PDR Poverty Assessment Report: From Valleys to Hilltops – 15 Years of Poverty 
Reduction, Report No. 38083-LA, 2 volumes 
 
World Food Programme (2007) 
Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Assessment  
 
_____ (2008) 
Standard Project Report: Recovery Assistance to the Disaster Prone and Vulnerable 
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APPENDIX 4 – EC-FUNDED MINE ACTION PROJECTS IN ASIA-PACIFIC 
CAMBODIA 




AGENCY PERIOD BUDGET LINE AMOUNT 
(€) 
TYPE OF ACTION 
1998 ASIA-PACIFIC CAMBODIA RELEX HI-B   B7-641 1,205,000 Support to CMAC Kampong Cham 
& Kampong Thom 
1998 ASIA-PACIFIC CAMBODIA RELEX Franklin Advisory 
Services 
  B7-641 745,000 Support to CMAC Siem Reap + 
Sisophon 
1998 ASIA-PACIFIC CAMBODIA RELEX Planet Consultants   B7-5076 1,035,000 Capacity building -- CMAC 
1998 ASIA-PACIFIC CAMBODIA ECHO HI-B   B7-210 350,000 Prosthesis for disabled 
1998 ASIA-PACIFIC CAMBODIA ECHO HALO   B7-210 1,000,000 Demining 
1999 ASIA-PACIFIC CAMBODIA ECHO HALO   B7-210 700,000 Demining 
2000 ASIA-PACIFIC CAMBODIA ECHO HI-B   B7-210 20,000 Survey on spontaneous demining 
2000 ASIA-PACIFIC CAMBODIA ECHO MAG   B7-210 700,000 Demining Battambang & Preah 
Vihear 
2000 ASIA-PACIFIC CAMBODIA RELEX PIRNEY 28/12/01 to ? B7-641 392,113 LT TA to CMAA 
2000 ASIA-PACIFIC CAMBODIA RELEX TEA CEGOS 01/06/02 to 
31/05/03 
B7-641 115,589 ST TA to CMAA 
2000 ASIA-PACIFIC CAMBODIA RELEX HI-B 01/06/01 to 
01/11/03 
B7-641 360,000 LUPU project? 
2002 ASIA-PACIFIC CAMBODIA ECHO HI-B   ECHO B7-210 450,000 Mine clearance 
2002 ASIA-PACIFIC CAMBODIA ECHO HALO   ECHO B7-210 305,000 Mine clearance 
2002 ASIA-PACIFIC CAMBODIA ECHO MAG   ECHO B7-210 105,000 Mine clearance 
2003 ASIA-PACIFIC CAMBODIA RELEX     B7-661 0 Not used???? 
2003 ASIA-PACIFIC CAMBODIA ECHO HI-B 01-12/2004 ECHO B7-210 270,000 Mine clearance 
2003 ASIA-PACIFIC CAMBODIA ECHO MAG 01-12/2004 ECHO B7-210 179,539 Mine clearance 
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AGENCY PERIOD BUDGET LINE AMOUNT 
(€) 
TYPE OF ACTION 
2004 ASIA-PACIFIC CAMBODIA ECHO MAG 01/11/2004-
30/10/2005 
ECHO B7-210 170,000 Demining and Mine Risk Education 
2007 ASIA-PACIFIC CAMBODIA RELEX CMAC 2008- B7-300 (ASIA) 1,172,848 Mine Clearance and Land Titling 
(ECOSORN) 
2007 ASIA-PACIFIC CAMBODIA EuropeAid/125980/
L/ACT/KH 
HI-F 2008- 19 02 04  500,000 Community participation to actions 
related to antipersonnel mines 
2007 ASIA-PACIFIC CAMBODIA EuropeAid/125980/
L/ACT/KH 
Ieaplia 2008- 19 02 04  500,000 Community participation to actions 












TYPE OF ACTION 
1998 ASIA-PACIFIC LAO PDR   HI-B     3,000,000 UXO clearance Savannakhet 
2000 ASIA-PACIFIC LAO PDR RELEX HI-B 26/02/01 to 
25/02/02 
B7-661 665,405 Support to Lao national UXO 
operations in Savannakhet 
2002 ASIA-PACIFIC LAO PDR RELEX HI-B 01/09/02 to 
31/12/04 
B7-661 877,300 Technical Assistance to UXO 
Clearance in Savannakhet province 
2002 ASIA-PACIFIC LAO PDR ECHO CARE   ECHO B7-210 100,000 Mine clearance & mine awareness 
2003 ASIA-PACIFIC LAO PDR ECHO CARE 2003-2004 23 02 01  254,339 Awareness-raising, capacity 
building and livelihood improvement 
2003 ASIA-PACIFIC LAO PDR RELEX HI-B 24/12/04 to 
23/06/07 
B7-661 1,000,000 Integrated UXO Threat Reduction in 
Savannakhet Province 
2004 ASIA-PACIFIC LAO PDR ECHO ZOA 2004-2005 23 02 01  503,027 Clearance and livelihood 
development  
2004 ASIA-PACIFIC LAO PDR RELEX MAG 10/01/05 to 
9/01/08 
B7-661 1,000,000 Humanitarian UXO Clearance in 
Khammoune Province 
2004 ASIA-PACIFIC LAO PDR ECHO MAG 01/10/04 to 
31/01/05 
ECHO B7-210 127,997 improving security, livelihood and 
ensuring safer behaviour 
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TYPE OF ACTION 
2007 ASIA-PACIFIC LAO PDR AIDCO NRA 10.07 - 9.10 19 04 03 
EIDHR 
100,000 Survey of UXO accidents & victims 
2008 ASIA-PACIFIC LAO PDR AIDCO HI 2008-10 21 03 01 500,000 Integrated Savannakhet 
2008 ASIA-PACIFIC LAO PDR AIDCO MAG 2008-10 21 03 01 500,000 Clearance Khammoune 
2008 ASIA-PACIFIC LAO PDR AIDCO UXO Lao 2008-10 21 03 01 150,000 Integrated Attapeiu 












TYPE OF ACTION 
2002 ASIA-PACIFIC SRI LANKA RELEX   12 months B7-303 800,000 LIS & mine clearance 
2002 ASIA-PACIFIC SRI LANKA ECHO Halo Trust, MAG, 
NPA,UNICEF 
12 months ECHO B7-210 3,050,000 Mine surveys, Mine clearance & 
mine awareness 
2003 ASIA-PACIFIC SRI LANKA ECHO UNICEF 01.07.2003-
21.12.2003 
ECHO B7-210 240,000 Mine Risk Education 
2003 ASIA-PACIFIC SRI LANKA ECHO HALO Trust 01/01/2004 - 
31/01/2005 
ECHO B7-210 600,000 De-mining 
2003 ASIA-PACIFIC SRI LANKA ECHO MAG 01/01/2004 - 
31/12/2004 
ECHO B7-210 400,000 Surveys and MRE 
2003 ASIA-PACIFIC SRI LANKA ECHO NPA 01/01/2004 - 
31/12/2004 
ECHO B7-210 600,000 De-mining and MRE 
2003 ASIA-PACIFIC SRI LANKA ECHO UNICEF 01/01/2004 - 
31/12/2004 
ECHO B7-210 300,000 MRE 
2003 ASIA-PACIFIC SRI LANKA ECHO HI-F 01/06/2004 - 
28/02/2005 
ECHO B7-210 100,000 Mine victims assistance 
2004 ASIA-PACIFIC SRI LANKA RELEX MAG 2005-06 B7-661 1,239,000 Mine Clearance possibly combined 
with minefield survey and marking 
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TYPE OF ACTION 
2005 ASIA-PACIFIC SRI LANKA RELEX UNDP   19 02 04  1,300,000 Technical survey, marking and 
fencing 
2005 ASIA-PACIFIC SRI LANKA RELEX UNDP   19 10 04 1,999,976 Mine action support 
2005 ASIA-PACIFIC SRI LANKA RELEX UNICEF   19 10 04 1,299,973 MRE + Mine victims assistance 
2005 ASIA-PACIFIC SRI LANKA ECHO Halo Trust 01/02/05-
31/01/06 
23 02 01 800,000 Demining and technical surveys 
2005 ASIA-PACIFIC SRI LANKA ECHO     23 02 01 200,000 TA capacity in the field 












TYPE OF ACTION 




ECHO B7-210 200,000 Victim assistance/Rehabilitation of 
people with disabilities/MRE among 
the refugee population 
2003 ASIA-PACIFIC BURMA / 
MYANMAR 
RELEX ICRC Jan 2004 – 
Jan-05 
19 02 04  500,000 Advocate against APLs, victim 
assistance 
2004 ASIA-PACIFIC BURMA / 
MYANMAR 
ECHO HI Jun 2004 –  
Jun 2005 
ECHO B7-210 250,000 Mine victims assistance, mine risk 
education 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
